The Equal Credit Opportunity Act\u27s Spousal Co-Signature Rules: Suretyship Contracts in Separate Property States by Taylor, Winnie F.




The Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Spousal Co-Signature Rules: 
Suretyship Contracts in Separate Property States 
Winnie F. Taylor 
Brooklyn Law School, winnie.taylor@brooklaw.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
48 Alb. L. Rev. 382 (1983-1984) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of BrooklynWorks. 
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT'S SPOUSAL
CO-SIGNATURE RULES: SURETYSHIP CONTRACTS IN
SEPARATE PROPERTY STATES
Winnie F. Taylor*
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act' (ECOA) was passed in 1974 to
eradicate discrimination against credit applicants resulting from con-
sideration of factors other than creditworthiness. 2  Although the
ECOA has a broad scope, s perhaps the most common inquiry regard-
ing its applicability is: When may a lender require the signatures of
both husband and wife?4 The answer to this question is complex, and
therefore, it is not surprising that there are conflicting views regard-
ing the appropriate response. Despite these conflicts, however, each
view is premised on common factors: where the couple lives, what
type of credit is being requested, and what documents are required to
be signed.
Although no ECOA provision specifically addresses the question of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Law School. B.A., 1972, Grambling State;
J.D., 1975, Buffalo; LL.M., 1979, Wisconsin. Member, Federal Reserve Board's Consumer Advi-
sory Council.
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1697 (Supp. VI 1976). For an excellent
summary of the ECOA's legislative history, see Baer, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and
the "Effects Test," 95 BANKING L.J. 241, 245-51 (1978).
' See S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 403, 404.
O For a general overview of the broad applicability of the ECOA, see Taylor, Meeting The
Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring
Systems, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 73, 76-79 (1980). Before 1974 the credit evaluation process was
virtually unregulated by federal law. Denial of credit on the basis of sex and marital status
precipitated congressional support for legislation "to insure that the various financial institu-
tions . . . exercise their responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and
without discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status." 15 U.S.C. § 1691e. Although the
ECOA was originally passed to eliminate discrimination towards female credit applicants, the
ECOA was amended in 1976 to expand its coverage to discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance income, and the exercise of rights
guaranteed under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Id. §§ 1691, 1691a.-1691f. (amending 15
U.S.C. § 1691 (1976)).
The ECOA has been described as fostering an unusual amount of litigation because of the
broad range of possible litigants (anyone who is turned down for credit); promising civil reme-
dies; potential class actions based on retrospective reviews of lending practices which disclose
discrimination against a particular group; and new defenses in collection cases based on the
ECOA's spousal co-signature rules. However, it is the rules on spousal co-signatures which raise
the most questions of applicability to a particular situation. See Schiller, The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act: A Wellspring of Litigation, 32 J. Mo. B. 407, 409 (1976).
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when a creditor may require the signatures of both spouses,5 section
202.7(d)6 of Regulation B,7 the regulation implementing the Act, di-
rectly addresses the spousal co-signature question. The ECOA regula-
tory provisions, however, have often been criticized for their failure
5 According to the ECOA:
A request for the signature of both parties to a marriage for the purpose of creating a
valid lien, passing clear title, waiving inchoate rights to property, or assigning earnings,
shall not constitute discrimination under this subchapter: Provided, however, that this
provision shall not be construed to permit a creditor to take sex or marital status into
account in connection with the evaluation of creditworthiness of any applicant.
15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a) (Supp. VI 1976) (emphasis in original).
6 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) (1977) states in pertinent part:
(d) Signature of spouse or other person.
(1) Except as provided in this subsection, a creditor shall not require the signa-
ture of an applicant's spouse or other person, other than a joint applicant, on any
credit instrument if the applicant qualifies under the creditor's standards of
creditworthiness for the amount and terms of the credit requested.
(2) If an applicant requests unsecured credit and relies in part upon property to
establish creditworthiness, a creditor may consider State law; the form of owner-
ship of the property; its susceptibility to attachment, execution, severance, and
partition; and other factors that may affect the value to the creditor of the appli-
cant's interest in the property. If necessary to satisfy the creditor's standards of
creditworthiness, the creditor may require the signature of the applicant's spouse
or other person on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed by the credi-
tor to be necessary, under applicable State law to make the property relied upon
available to satisfy the debt in the event of default.
(3) If a married applicant requests unsecured credit and resides in a community
property State or if the property upon which the applicant is relying is located in
such a State, a creditor may require the signature of the spouse on any instrument
necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary, under applicable
State law to make the community property available to satisfy the debt in the
event of default if:
(i) Applicable State law denied the applicant power to manage or control
sufficient community property to qualify for the amount of credit requested
under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness; and
(ii) The applicant does not have sufficient separate property to qualify for
the amount of credit requested without regard to community property.
(4) If an applicant requests secured credit, a creditor may require the signature
of the applicant's spouse or other person on any instrument necessary, or reasona-
bly believed by the creditor to be necessary, under applicable State law to make
the property being offered as security available to satisfy the debt in the event of
default, for example, any instrument to create a valid lien, pass clear title, waive
inchoate rights, or assign earnings.
(5) If, under a creditor's standards of creditworthiness, the personal liability of
an additional party is necessary to support the extension of the credit requested, a
creditor may request that the applicant obtain a co-signer, guarantor, or the like.
The applicant's spouse may serve as an additional party, but a creditor shall not
require that the spouse be the additional party. For the purposes of paragraph (d)
of this section, a creditor shall not impose requirements upon an additional party
that the creditor may not impose upon an applicant.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Regulation B is composed of 12 C.F.R. Part 202.
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to provide clear and meaningful guidelines8 to creditors. Section
202.7(d) has been dubbed "the most controversial provision of Regu-
lation B."9
The controversy surrounding Regulation B section 202.7(d) pri-
marily stems from two of its requirements. The first involves circum-
stances under which a creditor may require one spouse to co-sign for
the other in separate property states. 10 The second concerns the gen-
eral applicability of Regulation B spousal co-signature rules to com-
munity property states.1
This Article will examine the ECOA spousal co-signature question
as it relates to separate property states and will analyze the diverse
approaches to its resolution. This examination will include a discus-
sion of the controversial aspects of Regulation B section 202.7(d), fol-
lowed by a discussion of proposals for an equitable resolution of the
spousal co-signature problem.
I. MANDATORY SPOUSAL Co-SIGNATURE RULES
A. Individual, Unsecured Credit
The suretyship contract has been in existence since antiquity.
2
The participation of the surety or cosigner served the dual purpose of
providing security to the creditor while allowing the debtor to obtain
credit unsupported by collateral security arrangements. Conse-
quently, debtors were able to establish credit reputations without en-
cumbering their property or business operations.'"
In separate property states, lending institutions traditionally re-
quired spouses to co-sign for each other when one or both of them
applied for credit.'4 If spouses apply jointly for credit, there is no
See, e.g., Comment, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976: A Meaning-
ful Step Toward The Elimination of Credit Discrimination, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 149, 161
(1976).
9 See Jacobs, An Introduction to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act for the Commercial
Creditor, 83 CoM. L.J. 338 (1978).
-0 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1), (2), (5) (1977). See supra note 6.
1 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(3), (4) (1977). See supra note 6. The "community property" spousal
co-signature problem is beyond the scope of this Article.
" See Loyd, The Surety, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1917).
" See generally Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77
YALE L.J. 833, 834 (1968).
" See Geary, Equal Credit Opportunity - An Analysis of Regulation B, 31 Bus. LAW. 1641,
1652 (1976). Testimony and statements made to Congress during the ECOA congressional hear-
ings also revealed that the practice of automatically requiring spousal co-signaturbs was wide-
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problem in requiring the signature of each. As a "co-maker"15 or
"joint applicant,"16 each spouse voluntarily agrees to be primarily lia-
spread, particularly in regard to the female spouse. The following cases emphasized this point:
A married doctor who had an American Express card of her own when she was single was
asked to have her husband sign a reapplication when she requested a simple name
change. Sonia Fuentes, a lawyer who had been practicing for 15 years, was refused hav-
ing a new credit card issued after she notified various stores that she had changed her
name. She was told that she had to submit another application with information about
her husband's income accompanied with his signature.
See Hearings on H.R. 14856 & H.R. 14908, Part 2, Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs
of the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974) (submitted draft of
research on Women and Credit by Sylvia L. Beckey, Legislative Attorney, American Law Divi-
sion, Congressional Research Service, 633, 668 n.3) [hereinafter cited as ECOA Hearings].
In another case involving a lawyer, a financially independent female attorney earning in ex-
cess of $25,000 annually could not get a one-year $3,000 car loan without her husband's signa-
ture. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1973, at 99, col. 8.
Moreover, it is not just spouses who are required to vouch for a woman's creditworthiness.
Often single women cannot get a loan without a male co-signer. In one case, a woman in her
40's who, as head of the household, wanted to buy a house for herself and her children, could
not get a mortgage without the signature of her 70 year old father who was living on a pension.
See Note, Equal Credit: You Can Get There From Here - The Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 52 N.D.L. REv. 380, 383 (1975) (citing S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973)).
Additionally, the spousal co-signature requirement has dominated commercial as well as con-
sumer lending. "[lit is generally the practice of banks to require the personal guarantees of the
principals of close corporations and similar small business borrowers. Further, it has been the
practice of many banks to require the spouses of these principals to join in such guaranties."
Jacobs, supra note 9, at 334. For example, a woman who was the sole supporter of her husband
and who earned $16,000 a year, was denied a small business loan because she did not have her
husband's authorization. See ECOA Hearings, supra at 637.
In discussing the economic problems of women entrepreneurs, one spokeswoman identified
"discriminatory laws which in some states require a woman to obtain her husband's or father's
signature..." as a major problem facing American businesswomen. See Economic Problems of
Women: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., Part 3, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 443, 571
(1973) (statement of N. Jeanne Wertz) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Economic
Problems of Women], See also ECOA Hearings, supra note 13, at 472 (statement of the Hon.
Barbara Jordan, D. Texas, commenting that women entrepreneurs do not have equal access to
bank loans, investment capital or venture capital partially because of state laws requiring the
signature of husbands for business loans).
Several state statutes which formerly required the signature of both spouses if one spouse
wanted to use his or her wages as collateral for a debt include: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 381-17
(1947); IND. CODE §§ 40-208 (1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 154, §§ 2 & 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.07 (West 1966); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1506 (1947); PA. STAT.
ANN tit. 43, § 274 (Purdon 1964); WYo. STAT. § 27-202 (1957).
" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 32 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines "co-makers" as persons who put
their names to a note without any intention of lending their credit to the accommodated party.
It is important to distinguish "co-maker" from "co-signer." In this article "co-signer" refers to
persons who act as surety for others. A "surety" is one who undertakes to pay money or to do
any other act in the event that the principal fails in his obligation. Essentially, the surety incurs
liability for the benefit of another without sharing in the consideration. Id. at 1611. "Surety"
and "co-signer" will be used interchangeably throughout this article.
16 "Joint applicants" are persons who undertake primary responsibility to repay a debt. Joint
accounts involve the pooling of the married couple's resources in determining creditworthiness.
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ble for repayment of the debt.' 7 The problem arises when only one
spouse is interested in obtaining unsecured credit. 8 When the bor-
rower is single, the creditor seeks the borrower's signature alone, as-
suming the borrower is individually creditworthy. But if the borrower
is married, the creditor requires the signature of both spouses' 9 not-
withstanding the fact of individual creditworthiness. The non-bor-
rowing spouse is required to co-sign as a surety for the borrower. By
requiring suretyship of the non-borrowing spouse as a condition to
the borrowing spouse's ability to obtain unsecured credit, lenders
place themselves in the optimal position for successful repayment.
Having two persons personally responsible to repay a debt is obvi-
ously better than having one.20
B. Unnecessary Spousal Co-Signature and the ECOA
One major problem inherent in the mandatory spousal co-signer
rule is that it permits creditors to require a co-signer even though the
applicant spouse is independently creditworthy. Thus, the rule con-
tradicts the Regulation B directive that creditors must focus on an
See ECOA Hearings, supra note 14, at 487 (statement of Wallis G. Hocker, Vice-President &
General Credit Manager, J.C. Penney).
'7 In Cragin v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 379 (D. Nev. 1980), the court held
that requiring both joint applicants to sign loan documents did not violate the signature re-
quirements of the ECOA and Regulation B. Similarly, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio held that where both parties are joint obligors on the original agree-
ment, the creditor may require both spouses' signatures. Sutliff v. County Say. & Loan Co., 533
F. Supp. 1307 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
" If credit is secured, a creditor may obtain the signature of the non-applicant spouse
on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary,
under applicable State law to make the property being offered as security available to
satisfy the debt in the event of default, for example, any instrument to create a valid
lien, pass clear title, waive inchoate rights, or assign earnings.
12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(4) (1977).
" An unusual case of a creditor's refusal to consider a married borrower's individual
creditworthiness was brought to the Senate's attention by Senator William Brock (Rep. Ten-
nessee). Senator Brock told his colleagues about a 41-year-old female mayor of Davenport, Iowa
who had been denied credit because her husband had not signed the loan documents. Mayor
Kirschbaum's story is told in the following excerpt from the Knoxville News-Sentinel:
Kathryn Kirschbaum can be mayor of Davenport, Iowa, a city of about 103,000 but she
can't get a credit card from Bank-Americard on her own.
The reason, she says, is that the signature of her husband, Raymond, has to be on the
application. She doesn't feel his signature is necessary. She feels her own credentials are
enough.
119 CONG. REC. 24,061 (1973).
'o In this regard, the creditor is requiring the signature of the spouse as "insurance, which is
useful 'just in case' the principal obligor attempts to transfer his assets to another person, or
dies or defaults . . ." Geary, supra note 14, at 1652.
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applicant's individual creditworthiness.21 To ensure that creditors
maintain a proper focus, Regulation B section 202.7(d)(1) states: "A
creditor shall not require the signature of an applicant's spouse or
other person, other than a joint applicant, on any credit instrument if
the applicant qualifies under the creditor's standards of creditworthi-
ness for the amount and terms of the credit requested. '22 Generally,
Regulation B section 202.7(d)(1) prohibits a creditor from routinely
requiring a co-signer. It unequivocally vitiates the historical practice
by creditors of requiring the signature of both spouses when one of
them applies for individual, unsecured credit.
Anderson v. United Finance Co. 28 is illustrative of one court's in-
tent to rigorously uphold the Regulation B section 202.7(d)(1) man-
date against unnecessary spousal co-signatures. In Anderson, a wife
independently applied for credit and was found to be creditworthy.
Nevertheless, she was told by the creditor that her husband's signa-
ture was required on the promissory note.24 The Ninth Circuit held
that the creditor violated Regulation B by requiring the non-appli-
cant spouse's signature.2" The court declared that Regulation B will
not permit creditors to obtain additional signatures when the appli-
cant individually qualifies for the credit requested s.2  Anderson is sig-
nificant in that it judicially sanctions the Federal Reserve Board's
authority under Regulation B to proscribe spousal co-signature rules
that consider factors other than the applicant spouse's individual
creditworthiness.
27
" In stating the purpose of the ECOA, Congress boldly declared that: "It is the purpose of
this Act to require that financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of credit
make that credit equally available to all creditworthy customers without regard to sex or mari-
tal status." 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1974) (emphasis added).
- 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1) (1977).
2 666 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1982).
"I Id. at 1275.
15 Id. at 1276. Earlier the trial court had held that the creditor only "technically violated"
the ECOA by requiring the non-applicant spouse's signature. Id. According to that court, such
a violation did not result in discrimination. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. First, the court noted
that requiring a spouse's signature when it is not needed is "just the type of discrimination
which" the ECOA "was created to prohibit." Id. Second, the court cited precedent from the
Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency supporting its conclusion that
credit discrimination results when an applicant who individually qualifies for a loan is forced to
obtain his or her spouse's signature. Id. at 1277. Finally, the court concluded that by violating
Regulation B § 202.7(d)(1), the creditor violated the ECOA. Id.
Anderson also illustrates the potential absurdity of the mandatory spousal signature rule.
Despite the fact that Mrs. Anderson was independently creditworthy, her husband was re-
quired to co-sign, even though he was on welfare and disabled at the time the loan was re-
quested. Id. at 1276.
'6 Id.
" Anderson is also significant in several other respects. First, it sanctions the validity of
19841
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C. Enforcement of ECOA Co-Signature Rules
Although it is clearly illegal for creditors to uniformly require
spousal co-signatures, the consequences for violating Regulation B
are unclear. Assume that a creditor wrongfully obtains a spouse's co-
signature; then the principal spouse defaults and the creditor sues
the co-signing spouse. The co-signing spouse will defend by arguing
that Regulation B prohibits mandatory spousal co-signatures.
Whether, however, the co-signer's argument will defeat the creditor's
claim for payment and, moreover, whether the spouse who was forced
to co-sign may sue the creditor for violating Regulation B are ques-
tions not adequately resolved by the ECOA. With regard to the latter
question, the ECOA allows aggrieved credit "applicants" to recover
damages for credit discrimination against them. 28 Neither the Act nor
Regulation B, however, gives co-signers a statutory right to recover
damages. This inability to recover damages may lead a spouse who
has been illegally required to co-sign to think that he or she may
simply refuse to repay the debt.
Whether the co-signing spouse has a right to refuse payment under
the ECOA is also unclear. Normally, a creditor's breach of a federal
regulatory provision does not relieve the debtor of his or her obliga-
tion to the creditor.2 9 Here, however, the case is unique because the
spouse would not be a debtor but for the creditor's breach of the
ECOA.30 Thus, a persuasive argument can be made for releasing the
co-signer. The argument would be even more forceful if the ECOA's
legislative history indicated that Congress or the Federal Reserve
Board intended this result. There is, however, no evidence of congres-
Regulation B § 202.7(d)(1) and clarifies its purpose. In the Ninth Circuit court's opinion, "[tihe
rationale behind § 202.7(d)(1) is to insure that individual credit is, in reality, available to any
credit-worthy married applicant." Id. at 1277. Second, it gives an excellent analysis and discus-
sion of the ECOA damages provision. Id. at 1277-78.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1974). The provision states in pertinent part:
Civil liability
(a) Individual or class action for actual damages. Any creditor who fails to comply with
any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant
for any actual damages sustained by such applicant acting either in an individual capac-
ity or as a member of a class.
See also id. § 1691e(b)-(j) (prescribing other elements of the cause of action including other
remedies, jurisdiction, costs of suit, etc.).
"' See, e.g., Schuyler Nat'l Bank v. Gadsden, 191 U.S. 451 (1903) (holding that violations of
federal statutes governing bank's acquisition of security do not operate to make the obligation
unenforceable); Langham's Estate v. American Nat'l Bank, 165 F.2d 968, 969-70 (1948) (actions
by bank beyond restrictions imposed by federal banking law in obtaining leases furnishes no
basis for cancellation of contracts by lessor).
"0 See 15 U.C.C. LAw LETrER 8 (Jan. 1982).
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sional or regulatory intent regarding release of illegally obtained co-
signers. This lack of evidence indicates a serious oversight. Prohibit-
ing creditors from requiring spousal co-signatures without providing
a remedy for one whose signature has been wrongfully obtained obvi-
ously weakens a link in the ECOA enforcement chain. Creditors are
less likely to comply with a regulatory provision that can be violated
with impunity.
The Federal Reserve Board, however, attempts to resolve the issue
of whether a co-signer spouse has a duty to repay. In 1981, the Board
adopted an ECOA enforcement guide31 which addresses the question
of illegally obtained spousal co-signatures. The guide permits a regu-
latory agency either to order the release of an illegally required co-
signer or to oider the creditor to let the applicant name a substitute
co-signer.
3 2
If the agency affirmatively releases the co-signer, then it is unques-
tionable that the co-signer may refuse to repay. The problem, how-
ever, is that the guide apparently assumes that the co-signer is bound
to pay until the agency acts. If agency intervention never occurs, then
the co-signing spouse remains liable. Because there is no uniformity
among the enforcement agencies3" as to the frequency or comprehen-
siveness of their examinations," it would be overly presumptuous to
81 Id.
32 Id.
" The following federal agencies enforce Regulation B for the particular classes of creditors
stated: national banks (Comptroller of the Currency); state member banks (Federal Reserve
Bank serving the district in which the state member bank is located); nonmember insured
banks (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regional Director for the region in which the
nonmember insured bank is located); savings institutions insured by the FSLIC and members
of the FHLB System (except for savings banks insured by FDIC) (The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board Supervisory Agent in the district in which the institution is located); federal credit
unions (National Credit Union Administration); creditors subject to Civil Aeronautics Board
(Civil Aeronautics Board); creditors subject to Interstate Commerce Commission (Interstate
Commerce Commission); creditors subject to Packers and Stockyards Act (Packers and Stock-
yard Administration); small business investment companies (U.S. Small Business Administra-
tion); brokers and dealers (Securities and Exchange Commission); federal land banks, federal
land bank associations, federal intermediate credit banks and production credit associations
(Farm Credit Administration); retail, department stores, consumer finance companies, all other
creditors, and all nonbank credit card issuers (Federal Trade Commission).
For example, the Federal Reserve Board's Annual Report to Congress indicates that the
Federal Reserve System examined 400 banks in 1977, 1978 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 347, and
800 in 1978. Id. at 284. No figure was given for the number of banks examined in 1979, yet the
1980 annual report stated that 10% more banks were examined that year than those examined
in 1979. 1980 FED. REs. BD. ANN. REP. 77. Without making specific reference to the number of
compliance examinations, the 1981 annual report states that there was a 10% increase in over-
all ECOA compliance. 1981 FED. RES. BD. REP. 154.
The Comptroller of the Currency is another case in point. The Federal Reserve Board's An-
nual Report to Congress indicates that this agency reported 2,859 bank examinations in 1977,
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conclude that they will ferret out all situations involving wrongfully
obtained spousal co-signatures. Thus, agency intervention cannot be
relied upon to resolve this problem, and the co-signing spouse should
be released with or without agency intervention if forced to co-sign
for a creditworthy spouse.
Several other observations are in order regarding the ECOA en-
forcement guide. Although Regulation B allows the creditor to re-
quire a co-signer for an uncreditworthy applicant, the applicant has
the right to select this person. 85 A spouse may serve as the co-signer
only if the applicant indicates this preference. The ECOA enforce-
ment guide appears to be consistent with Regulation B in that it
gives the applicant spouse an opportunity to find a substitute co-
signer. 8 The guide does not go far enough, however, because it im-
plies that the co-signing spouse remains liable until the substitution
is made. The ultimate harshness of this result is evident in the in-
stance where a substitute co-signer is never found.
The shortcomings of the ECOA enforcement guide suggest that the
question regarding the right of an illegally required co-signer to re-
fuse to pay deserves more in-depth regulatory attention. While it is
significant that the Federal Reserve Board has identified the rights of
spousal co-signers as an ECOA problem area, the Board should
devote more time to resolving the problems arising from violation of
those rights.
D. Jointly Owned Property
The Regulation B rule allowing one spouse to obtain individual un-
secured credit without the co-signature of the other spouse is pre-
mised on the assumption that the applicant spouse's creditworthiness
be established without reliance on property jointly owned by both
1977 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 350, but none were listed for 1978. The 1979 report showed 1,779
bank examinations for that year, 1979 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 236, while the 1980 report did
not comment on the number of examinations made. Neither the 1981 nor the 1982 annual
report discussed the extent of agency examination for those years.
The extent and frequency of compliance examinations conducted by the Federal Home Loan
Board is also illustrative. Out of the six annual reports submitted to Congress by the Federal
Reserve Board for the years 1977-1982, the number of bank examinations was reflected in only
one. In 1979, there were 3,350 examinations. Id. While failure to include the number of compli-
ance examinations in the Federal Reserve Board Annual Reports does not mean that no agency
examinations were made, this haphazard account permits only hesitant reliance upon agency
intervention as an effective mechanism for releasing spouses whose co-signatures were wrong-
fully obtained.
8 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5).
06 See supra note 24.
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spouses. When jointly owned property is relied on to meet
creditworthiness standards, the general rule may vary, depending
upon the form of co-ownership. Regulation B requires creditors to
consider factors such as attachment, execution, severance and parti-
tion which may affect the value to the creditor of the applicant's in-
terest in the property.
3 7
Thus, if the applicant is requesting individual, unsecured credit
and is relying upon jointly held property to establish creditworthi-
ness, creditors must determine what portion of the property the ap-
plicant is able, under state law, to transfer without the signature of
the spouse.3 8 If the portion is great enough so that the applicant's
financial position meets the creditor's standards of creditworthiness,
no further signature may be required. 9
An example illustrates this point. Assume that a married female
applicant with a $15,000 annual gross income requests a $20,000 loan;
she lists property valued at $10,000 as co-owned with her spouse; and
that a showing of $15,000 gross income and/or property is sufficient
in this case to establish creditworthiness. Clearly, the applicant's in-
terest in the jointly owned property combined with her salary is suffi-
cient to establish her creditworthiness. Nevertheless, in such a case,
the creditor may still require the signature of her spouse if the prop-
erty relied upon is co-owned as tenants by the entirety.40 This is be-
cause state law would usually not permit the judgment-creditor of
only one of the owners to subject the property to severance or parti-
37 More specifically, Regulation B § 202.7(d)(2) provides that:
If an applicant requests unsecured credit and relies in part upon property to establish
creditworthiness, a creditor may consider State law; the form of ownership of the prop-
erty; its susceptibility to attachment, execution, severance, and partition; and other fac-
tors that may affect the value to the creditor of the applicant's interest in the property.
If necessary to satisfy the creditor's standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may re-
quire the signature of the applicant's spouse or other person on any instrument neces-
sary or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary, under applicable State law to
make the property relied upon available to satisfy the debt in the event of default.
" See Signature on Debt Instruments, Comptroller of the Currency Interpretive Letter, Oc-
tober 27, 1977, reproduced at 5 CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 42,100 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Signature on Debt Instruments Interpretive Letter].
39 Id.
40 When property is transferred to a husband and wife, a tenancy by the entirety is created,
unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed. The parties hold title to the whole estate with a
right of survivorship. Upon the death of either spouse, the other spouse takes the whole interest
to the exclusion of the deceased's heirs. The foundation of the tenancy by entirety is the joint
tenancy, adapted to the common law concept that parties to a marriage are legally only one
person. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1635 (4th ed. 1968) (citing Raptes v. Cheros, 259 Mass. 37,
155 N.E. 787 (1927); Smith v. Russell, 172 A.D. 793, 159 N.Y.S. 169 (1916); Dutton v. Buckley,
116 Or. 661, 242 P. 626 (1926)).
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tion, and thus the creditor would be unable to execute absent the
spouse's signature. 1 On the other hand, notwithstanding the fact
that the applicant's interest in the property is sufficient to establish
creditworthiness, if the creditor concludes that the form of ownership
(i.e., joint tenancy4 2 or tenancy in common 43 ) permits severance, par-
tition, and subsequent execution by the creditor upon the interest of
the applicant without the signature of the spouse on any document, a
spousal co-signature could not be legally required. 4
If, in the above hypothetical, the applicant spouse's interest in the
co-owned property was only $2,000 and therefore insufficient to meet
creditworthiness standards, the creditor could require the signature
of the other joint owner. In this situation, the additional signature is
allowed to protect the creditor's ability to reach the non-applicant's
assets upon which the credit decision was made.45 Thus, the non-ap-
plicant spouse's signature may be obtained only on the documents
necessary, under state law, to make the property available to the
creditor in the event of default. This does not mean, however, that
the creditor may routinely require the non-applicant spouse's signa-
ture on the note, thus subjecting the non-applicant to personal liabil-
ity on the loan." It may well be necessary to have that party sign
only a valid security instrument to make the property available. If so,
Regulation B would prohibit a creditor's request that the non-appli-
cant co-owner sign the note. This distinction between a promissory
note and any accompanying security agreement is crucial to compli-
ance with Regulation B.47
See Md. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-009 (Feb. 18, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Op. Atty. Gen. No.
82-009]. Maryland is typcial of most jurisdictions.
41 A joint tenancy is created by one conveyance to two or more persons who share an equal,
undivided interest in the property, each having the right of survivorship upon the death of any
joint tenant. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1634 (4th ed. 1968) (citing Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135
Ind. 178, 34 N.E. 999 (1893); Simons v. McLain, 51 Kan. 153, 32 P. 919 (1893); Van Ausdall v.
Van Ausdall, 48 R.I. 106, 135 A. 850 (1927)).
,3 A tenancy in common is a form of ownership whereby each tenant owns an undivided
interest in property, with no right of survivorship. Upon a tenant's death, his interest passes to
his estate or heirs. During the tenancy, each owner is entitled to equal use and possession.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1635 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citing Fullerton v. Storthz Bros. Inv. Co., 190
Ark. 198, 77 S.W.2d 966, 968 (1935); Fry v. Dewees, 151 Kan. 488, 99 P.2d 844, 847 (1940)).
4 As for unsecured loans, joint tenants and tenants in common can make their interests in
the property available to satisfy the debt in the case of default without the signature or consent
of any other co-tenant. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-009, supra note 41, at 6.
4 See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 344.
" See Schiller, supra note 4, at 410.
47 See Signature on Debt Instruments Interpretive Letter, supra note 38, at 2.
It is important to understand the difference between the note and the security agree-
ment. The note represents the promise to repay the debt. The security agreement per-
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Furthermore, if the creditor determines that the jointly held prop-
erty adds to the applicant's creditworthiness but does not make the
applicant creditworthy, then, while the creditor may request that the
applicant obtain a co-signer, the creditor may not require that the
spouse be that signatory.' Thus, if the applicant and the co-signer
together meet the creditworthiness standards without a consideration
of the value of the jointly held property, the creditor may not impose
any signature requirements on the applicant's spouse."9
Similarly, if the co-owned property listed does not add to the ap-
plicant's creditworthiness, then it could be contended that a request
for the signature of the non-applicant spouse would constitute a vio-
lation of Regulation B.50 For example, assume that both the appli-
cant's income' and loan requested are $20,000, but the applicant nev-
ertheless lists property valued at $10,000 as co-owned with her
spouse. On these facts, the form of co-ownership (i.e., tenancy in
common or tenanacy by the entirety) does not matter. The creditor
cannot require the signature of the non-applicant spouse on any doc-
ument because it is not necessary for the creditor to consider the co-
owned property to establish the applicant's creditworthiness.
The foregoing hypotheticals suggest that neither routinely request-
ing the signature of the non-applicant spouse who co-owns property
with the applicant nor disregarding jointly held property without re-
gard to its bearing on the creditworthiness of the applicant is accept-
able. Both practices are inconsistent with the purpose of the ECOA
and violate Regulation B.5
II. UNEVEN APPLICATION OF MANDATORY SPOUSAL Co-SIGNATURE
RULES
On its face, the mandatory spousal co-signature rule has the poten-
mits you to possess certain property to satisfy the debt if there is a default. A person
who signs a note and a security agreement agrees to repay the debt from other property
or funds if the property covered by the security agreement is insufficient. A person who
signs the security agreement alone agrees to give up his or her rights to the property if it
must be used to satisfy the debt. This is the only thing agreed to.
Id. See also W. TAYLOR, THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT: WHAT CREDIT UNIONS SHOULD
KNOW 44 (1981).
48 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5) (1977).
4'. For a thorough analysis of this situation, see Mitchell & Hudson, Equal Credit Quandary,
1973 MD. BANKING Q. 3 (Fall).
5oId.
51 See Federal Reserve Board Letter No. 5, Mar. 1, 1977, reproduced at 5 CONSUMER CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 42,084 (1977).
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tial to create major difficulty for all married persons. If one spouse
fails to convince the other to co-sign for a debt, then the spouse in-
terested in borrowing cannot obtain credit even though he or she is
independently creditworthy. As applied, however, the spousal co-sig-
nature requirement has imposed greater hardship on married women
than on married men, primarily because creditors have applied the
requirement unevenly. 52 In most instances, the husband has been re-
quired to co-sign for his wife's debts while the wife has not been re-
quired to sign for her husband's debts." This one-sided application
of the rule stems from the common law proposition that women could
not obligate themselves to repay the debts of third persons.5,
"' The following excerpt illustrates the common practice of uneven application of the spousal
co-signer rule:
A man and a woman with virtually identical qualifications applied for a $600 loan to
finance a used car without the signature of the other spouse. Each applicant was the
wage earner, and the spouse was in school. Eleven of the banks visited by the women
either strictly required the husband's signature or stated it was their preference, al-
though they would accept an application and possibly make an exception to the general
policy. When the same banks, plus two additional banks that would make no committ-
ment to the female applicant, were visited by the male interviewer, six said that they
would prefer both signatures but would make an exception for him; one insisted on both
signatures; and six told the male interviewer that he, as a married man, could obtain the
loan without his wife's signature.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 153 (1972).
The Commission's findings resulted from a survey of 23 commercial banks, conducted by the
St. Paul Department of Human Rights.
6 Male dominance in the marital relationship has often been cited as the historical justifica-
tion for allowing married men to obtain credit without their wife's signature. Wakefield v.
Wakefield, 149 Pa. Super. 9, 25 A.2d 841 (1942). One court held that its state statute prohibit-
ing married women co-signer contracts is justifiable, because: "[U]nder the common law the
husband is presumed to be the dominant of the two parties to the marriage and it is assumed
that it [the statute] was necessary to protect the wife's interest in connection with her property
.... Barnett v. Barnett, 262 Ala. 655, 659, 80 So. 2d 626, 630 (1955).
" Bradbury v. Howard, 31 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Schwartz v. Sacks, 2 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir.
1924); Cragford Bank v. Cummings, 216 Ala. 377, 113 So. 243 (1927) (married woman may not
be surety for her husband); Baker v. Owensboro Say. Bank & Trust Co.'s Receiver, 140 Ky. 121,
130 S.W. 969 (1910) (married woman cannot become personally liable as surety for anyone).
New York has traditionally enforced a married woman co-signer contract only if the wife
expressly stated in the contract her intent to bind her separate estate to repay the obligation
incurred. See Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N.Y. 199 (1877); Gosman v. Cruger, 69 N.Y. 87 (1877): Man-
hattan Brass & Mfg. Co. v. Thompson, 58 N.Y. 80 (1874); Trecking v. Rolland, 53 N.Y. 422
(1873); Corn Exch. Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N.Y. 613 (1870); Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858).
Nebraska courts held similarly. See, e.g., Grand Island Banking Co. v. Wright, 53 Neb. 574, 74
N.W. 82 (1898).
Florida enforced married women co-signer contracts only if the husband gave written consent
that the wife could obligate her separate property. See, e.g., Fla. Op. Att'y Gen., 061-182, Nov.
13, 1961.
In Missouri and West Virginia, where the husband incurred the debt and the wife merely co-
signed thereby consenting to a security interest in property owned jointly by both of them, the
court required that all of the husband's portion of property be exhausted before selling his
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Ancient Rome was the birthplace of this concept. Under Roman
law, the inability to act as surety was not unique to married women;
it applied to all women. 5 American common law, on the other hand,
limited the disability to married women, because at common law a
married women was incapable of acting as a legal person. 5 By mar-
rying, the husband and wife became one, with the husband maintain-
ing his continuous capacity to contract and the wife losing, in large
part, her own contractual capacity.5
A. Married Women Co-Signature Contracts and State Coverture
Laws
The laws prohibiting married women from becoming sureties were
embodied in a set of protective common law rules known as "cover-
ture" laws. 5' These rules placed married women under the "disability
of coverture" which limited their contractual freedom.59 Several theo-
wife's property. See, e.g. Wilcox v. Todd, 64 Mo. 388 (1877); Jones v. Thorn, 45 W. Va. 186, 32
S.E. 173 (1898).
Illinois' common law held a wife possessed no capacity to contract. See, e.g., Forsyth v.
Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 81 N.E. 1028 (1907). All contracts of married women were absolutely void.
McLean v. Griswald, 22 Ill. 218 (1859).
88 In Rome, circa A.D. 46, all women were forbidden by law from entering into suretyship
contracts. A special Senate decree, "Senatus-consultum Velleianum," prohibited married
women from making contracts of any kind, including suretyship contracts. See generally Com-
ment, Women Sureties, 76 S. AFR'N L.J. 322 (1959). See also Loyd, supra note 12, at 45.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Tony v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 66
(1866); Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 90, 92 (1866); Wynn v. Southan, 86 Va. 946, 11 S.E. 878
(1890).
One commentator has noted that requiring the signatures of both parties to a marriage tends
to perpetuate the legal position of women as non-persons. See ECOA Hearings, supra note 14,
at 396 (Statement of Carol Burris, President, Women's Lobby, Inc.).
67 See Bysiewicz & MacDonnell, Married Women's Surnames, 5 CONN. L. REV. 598, 601
(1973). See also Goldberg v. Zellner, 218 Ark. 239, 235 S.W. 870 (1921); Love v. Moynehan, 16
Ill. 277, 280 (1855); In Re Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 22 N.E.2d 49 (1939); Vigilant
Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955).
" "Coverture" refers to the period of time during a woman's marriage. Under the English
common law, a single woman or a "feme sole" became known to the law upon her marriage as a
"feme covert." Note, The Impact of Michigan's Common-Law Disabilities of Coverture on
Married Women's Access to Credit, 74 MICH. L. REV. 76, 78 (1975). "Covert" means protected
or sheltered. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 439 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
89 At common law women labored under the disability of coverture and could not become a
surety for another. Duran v. Judson, 128 Ga. App. 459, 197 S.E.2d 163, afj'd, 231 Ga. 206, 200
S.E.2d 872 (1973). In fact, under the coverture doctrine, married women had no contractual
capacity. See Knowles, The Legal Status of Women In Alabama, II: A Crazy Quilt Restitched,
33 ALA. L. REV. 375, 378 (1982). Alabama and Georgia are typcial of most jurisdictions. See
generally Cameron, Coverture's Last Stand: The Married Woman's Lack of Contractual Ca-
pacity in Michigan, 8 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 75 (1981).
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ries have been espoused to explain why married women needed pro-
tection from entering into suretyship contracts. One theory is that
the coverture laws were needed to protect married women from the
temptation of interceding on behalf of third persons, thereby risking
the loss of all their private property.60 This theory apparently regards
the married woman as one who possesses an uncontrollable urge to
assist others, even to her own personal detriment. Another theory
views the laws as necessary to protect married women from the im-
portunitites of their husbands." This theory is based on the assump-
tion that most husbands are overbearing and unscrupulous and that
married women cannot be trusted to resist their husband's solicita-
tions. Still a third theory perceives the laws against married women
suretyship contracts as premised on the assumption that married
women lack the intelligence to understand and competently handle
contractual matters. Thus, under this theory, the laws are needed to
protect married women from their own ignorance.62
Although all states had some form of coverture law6 s to protect
married women, there was not total agreement that the coverture
laws regarding suretyship contracts were actually protective. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court believed these laws crippled rather than
benefitted married women. In First Wisconsin National Bank of
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Patent Leather Co.," the court held that
the inability of a married woman to contract as a surety for the debts
of another was not a special protection she enjoyed. The court con-
cluded that in reality the rule was for her husband's benefit," and
noted the irony in a law that protected a married woman by placing
her under contractual "disabilities."66
'0 Comment, supra note 55, at 323.
e" An Alabama court declared that its statute prohibiting married women co-signer contracts
"is founded upon public policy, which is to protect the wife's estate against the influence of her
husband . . ." Sims v. Hester, 228 Ala. 321, 322, 153 So. 281, 282 (1934). See also Noel v.
Tucker, 233 Ala. 349, 171 So. 640 (1936). A Georgia court also believed that married women
should be protected partially because of: "[T]he husband's influence over the wife, and the
necessity of protecting the wife's right to contract and to own property against his persuasion of
the natural tendency of a wife to sacrifice her separate estate to save her husband from
financial disaster." Gross v. Whitley, 128 Ga. 79, 79, 57 S.E. 94, 96 (1907).
02 See Loomis v. Gray, 60 Idaho 193, 90 P.2d 529 (1939).
63 See Note, supra note 58, at 78 (1975).
, 179 Wis. 117, 190 N.W. 822 (1922).
" Id. at 123, 190 N.W. at 824.
66 Id. The court first cited Blackstone's observations of a woman's legal status merging with
her husband's upon marriage, and then noted: "'We may observe that even the disabilities
which the wife lies under [upon marriage] are for the most part intended for her protection and
benefit; so great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of England.'" Id. The court then made
the following statement regarding the disabilities under which a married woman labored at
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Careful examination of coverture laws caused many states to ques-
tion their efficacy. Eventually, state legislatures began to systemati-
cally remove coverture disabilities by enacting Married Women's
Property Acts. 7 Generally, the Married Women's Property Acts re-
common law:
It is to be noted, however, that in this very phrase, as in the discussion of related sub-
jects, Blackstone referred to the limitations imposed on the wife by marriage as 'disabili-
ties,' and while in the closing sentence he says they are intended for her protection and
benefit, nevertheless the theory of the law as stated by Blackstone as well as other com-
mon-law writers clearly shows that as to the wife they were considered disabilities and as
to the husband as an assertion of a right which he enjoyed for his personal benefit and
protection.
Id.
The Kentucky high court agreed that the coverture laws barring married women co-signer
contracts were for the husband's benefit. Voicing this opinion, that court said: "[Wie appre-
hend that at the common law the so-called protection of the feme covert from liability, on her
executory contracts, so as to relieve her general estate pledged to secure their execution, was in
reality out of consideration of the husband's marital rights . . ." Daviess County Bank & Trust
Co. v. Wright, 129 Ky. 21, 18, 110 S.W. 361, 362 (1908).
" See Note, supra note 58, at 79. Mississippi was the first state to enact a married women's
statute. Id. at n.28. Nearly every state adopted a married women's property act or a constitu-
tional provision which changed the old common law rule barring married women from con-
tracting so as to give the married woman substantially the same contractual capacity as her
husband. Cameron, Michigan's New Statute On Married Women's Contractual Capacity: The
End of Coverture, 9 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 22 (1982).
All separate property states and the District of Columbia have statutory provisons which can
be labeled as "Married Women's Property Acts." See ALA. CODE §§ 65-76 (1959); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 25.15.010-.110 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-401 to -402, -404, -406 to -415 (1971); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 90-2-1 to -11 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-9 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§
311-14 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-201 to -215 (1967); FLA. STAT. §§ 708.08-.10 (1971); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 53-501 to -503, 53-505 to -508, -510 & -512 (1961 & Supp. 1970); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 573-1 to -2, 573-6 to -7, 574-1 to -3 & -5 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-16 (Smith-
Hurd 1959); IND. CODE ANN. § 38-101 (Burns 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 597.1-.5, 597.16-.19
(WEST 1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-201, -207 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 404.010-.060
(BALDWIN 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 161-65 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, §§ 1-5,
11, 14-20 (1957 & Supp. 1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, §§ 1-2, 7-13 (West 1958 & Supp.
1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 557.1-.2, .4, .11, .51, .52, 557.201-.209 (1948); MINN. STAT ANN. §§
519.01-.03 (West 1945); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 451-56 (1942); Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.250 (1949);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 36-101 to -105 (1961); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-201 to -207 (1968); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. 99 460:1, :2, :5 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-16 (West Supp. 1973-1974); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW §9 3-301 to -315 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-1 to -6 (1966); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-07-04 to -08 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3103.04-.07 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 4-5, 8-9, 12-13 (West 1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 108.010-.080 (1973); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 48, §§ 32.1 to .26 (Purdon 1936); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-4-1 to -3, -9, -12, -14 (1969);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-216, 20-203 to -204, 20-206 to -207 (Law. Co-op. 1962); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 25-2-4 to -8, -10, -12, -14 to -15 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-601 to -605 (1955);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-1 to -8 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 61-69 (1974); VA. CODE §§ 55-
35 to -47 (1969); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-3-1 to -22 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 246.01-.11 (West 1957);
WYo. STAT. §§ 20-22 to -29, -31 (1959).
The eight community property states also have statutory provisions that can most appropri-
ately be grouped under the heading of "Married Women's Property Acts." See ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 25-211, -213 to -215 (Supp. 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5103-04 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE
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move a married woman's common law disability to contract. They do
not, however, confer full contractual freedom.68 Several Married
Women's Property Acts impliedly provide for married women surety-
ship contracts in that they contain general language removing all
contractual disabilities of married women. e In many jurisdictions
courts have interpreted provisions of Married Women's Property
Acts as allowing for such contracts.7
Hawaii is the only state which expressly sanctions the validity of
married women suretyship contracts.7 In contrast, a New York stat-
ute merely implies this result.72 That statute provides that, in respect
to property, a married woman has the right to contract and is liable
on such contracts, "as if she were unmarried. T7  Although the New
York statutory language does not specifically say that married women
may enter into suretyship contracts, the statute's legislative history
and case law support this interpretation .7  For example, in Gates v.
§§ 4-1830, 32-903 to -913 (1947); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-51, 9-101 to -105 (West 1965); Nzv.
REv. STAT. §§ 123.030-.070 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3-1 to -8, 57-4-1 to -9 (1962); Tx.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.03, 5.01 to .03, .21 -.22 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.01.0 to
.100, 26.16.140 to .205 (1964).
See Note, supra note 58, at 87.
69 States granting married women co-signer rights by enactment of statutes removing all
common law coverture disabilities: ALASKA STAT. § 25.15.110 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-401
(1947); IND. CODE § 31-1-9-14 (1923); MINN. STAT. § 93-3-1 (1973); OR. REv. STAT. § 108.010
(1979).
"0 In Mayo v. Hutchinson, 57 Me. 546, 547 (1870), it was held that a married woman may be
a co-signer and that she will be bound by the suretyship obligation. See also Blake v. Blake, 64
Me. 177 (1874). Other courts have held similarly by construing state statutes to allow married
women co-signers. See, e.g., Stone v. Billings, 167 Ill. 170, 47 N.E. 372 (1897), overruling Wil-
liams v. Hugunin, 69 Ill. 214 (1873); Wolf v. Van Metre, 23 Iowa 397 (1867); Deering v. Boyle, 8
Kan. 351 (1871); Gilbert v. Brown, 123 Ky. 703, 97 S.W. 40 (1906); Frederick-Town Say. Inst. v.
Michael, 81 Md. 487, 32 A. 189 (1895); Major v. Holmes, 124 Mass. 108 (1878); Wolf v. Banning,
3 Minn. 202 (1859); Gates v. Williams, 10 Misc. 403, 29 N.Y.S. 712 (C.P. 1894); Bristol Grocery
v. Bails, 177 N.C. 298, 98 S.E. 768 (1919); Temple v. State, 74 Okla. 215, 178 P. 113 (1919);
Pelzer v. Campbell, 15 S.C. 581 (1850); Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 90 S.W. 485 (1906); First
Wisconsin Nat'l Bank v. Milwaukee Patent Leather Co., 197 Wis. 117, 190 N.W. 822 (1922),
overruling Merrell v. Purdy, 129 Wis. 331, 109 N.W. 82 (1906).
71 HAWAII REv. STAT. § 573-4 (1955) states: "All women, upon attaining their majority and
having the necessary property qualifications as by law required, may act, serve, and be sureties
on all bonds and undertakings required under the laws of the State." That a wife may lawfully
become surety for her husband is also settled by case law in Hawaii. See In re Estate of Manuel
Pinheiro, 33 Haw. 266, 230-231 (1934).
72 This New York statute reads in pertinent part: "A married woman has all the rights in
respect to property ... to make contracts in respect thereto with any person ... and be liable
on such contracts, as if she were unmarried." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-301 (McKinney 1978).
73 Id.
7, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-301 replaced L. 1884, c. 381, which had amplified the powers of
a married woman so that she could enter into general contracts with third persons with like
effect and in the same form as if unmarried, whether such contracts related to her separate
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Williams,7 a New York court upheld the validity of a wife's surety-
ship contract although the note evidencing the agreement was en-
dorsed by her husband. The court concluded that by endorsing the
promissory note, the husband acted as the wife's agent and thereby
obligated her on the note.76 Other New York cases supporting mar-
ried women suretyship contracts have held that such contracts must
be supported by consideration equal to that required on the contract
of any other surety.77
The Married Women's Property Acts represented a turning point
because their enactment greatly expanded the contractual rights of
married women. Nevertheless, married women did not universally
achieve contractual equality with respect to suretyship contracts.7 8
For example, unlike the New York courts, other state courts constru-
ing similar statutes refused to construe the "contract as if unmar-
estate or not. See Blaechinska v. Howard Mission, 130 N.Y. 497, 29 N.E. 755 (1892). See also
Amberg v. Manhattan Life Ins., 171 N.Y. 314, 63 N.E. 1111 (1902); Busch v. Klein, 38 A.D. 624,
55 N.Y.S. 917 (1899); Bowery Nat'l Bank v. Sniffen, 54 Hun. 394, 7 N.Y.S. 520 (Sup. Ct. 1887).
75 9 Misc. 176, 29 N.Y.S. 712 (C.P. 1894)
74 Id.
77 See, e.g., Harlem River Bank v. Meyer, 16 N.Y.S. 872, 873 (C.P. 1892); Bauer v. Ambs, 144
A.D. 274, 128 N.Y.S. 1024 (1911). Like New York, twenty states and the District of Columbia
allow married women to have the same contractual rights as unmarried women: ALA. CODE §
30-4-8 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 25.15.110 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-208 (1973); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 311 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1971); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 404.020 (Baldwin
1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 164 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, §§ 1-2 (1975); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § 2 (West 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:2-1 (West Supp. 1973-1974); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-301 (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-97-05 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-4-3 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-5-10 (Law. Co-op.
1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-2-7 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-2 (1953); UTAH STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 61 (1974); VA. CODE § 55-36 (1981); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 30-208 (West 1968).
Also, like New York, many of the above states have interpreted the "contract as if she were
unmarried" language as impliedly allowing married women suretyship contracts. For example,
in Savings Bank of Manchester v. Kane, 35 Conn. Supp. 82, 396 A.2d 952 (C.P. 1978), a Con-
necticut court held that a wife may be a surety for her husband. A Montana court implied the
validity of a wife as a surety in Ott v. Fidelity Finance Co., 158 Mont. 91, 95, 488 P.2d 1148
(1971). In several cases, a wife acted as surety for her husband without objection by the court.
These cases also impliedly sanction the validity of married women suretyship contracts. See
Eisenberg v. Albert, 40 Ohio St. 631 (1884); Fugate v. Allen, 158 Va. 143, 147, 149 S.E. 501
(1929); Wyoming Discount Corp. v. Lamar, 444 P.2d 620, 622 (Wyo. 1968). Other states have
been more specific in allowing married women suretyship contracts. An Ohio court declared
that a wife may pledge her separate property for her husband's debt and become a surety or
guarantor. People's Ins. Co. v. McDonnel, 41 Ohio St. 650, 659 (1885). More generally, ALASKA
STAT. § 25.15.10, provides that "all common law disabilities not also imposed upon the husband
are removed [from the wife]." A Utah court held that "in this state by constitutional provision
and statutory enactments the common law disabilities of married women have been abrogated,
and married women are in all respects, with reference to their separate property and power to
contract on the same footing with men." Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 536, 46 P.2d 674,
679 (1935).
7 See Bysiewicz & MacDonnell, supra note 57, at 601.
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ried" language to allow married women suretyship contracts. 9 An
early Pennsylvania statute, for instance, provided that a married wo-
man may contract as if she were unmarried but "may not become
accomodation endorser, maker, guarantor or surety for another."8
Similarly, an Alabama statute allowing a married woman to contract
as if she were unmarried, also stated that "the wife shall not, directly
or indirectly, become the surety for her husband."'" The tendency of
most state courts, however, was to allow married women suretyship
contracts.82 Despite this judicial trend, a few state statutes prohibit-
ing married women suretyship contracts remained for a considerable
number of years. 8 By 1975, however, the year the ECOA became ef-
79 See Hanchey v. Powell, 171 Ala. 597, 55 So. 97 (1911); Gross v. Whiteley, 128 Ga. 79, 57
S.E. 94 (1907); Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin, 14 Idaho 75, 93 P. 504 (1908); Williams v.
Hugunin, 69 I1. 214 (1873); Field v. Campbell, 164 Ind. 389, 72 N.E. 260 (1904); Third Bank of
Louisville v. Tierney, 128 Ky. 836 (1880); West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464 (1874); Sears v.
Birbeck, 321 Pa. 375, 184 A. 6 (1936); First Nat'l Bank v. Bertoli, 87 Vt. 297, 89 A. 359 (1913).
80 1893 Pa. Laws 344, § 2 (codified in 48 PA. STAT. ANN. § 32 (Purdon)). Georgia had a similar
provision. It provided in part: "[W]hile the wife may contract, she may not bind her separate
estate by any contract of suretyship nor by the assumption of the debts of her husband .
GA. CODE § 53-503 (1935).
81 ALA. CODE § 4497 (1907). Although Alabama courts recognized that a married woman's
general disability to contract had been statutorily removed, they noted that her original disabil-
ity as to co-signer contracts still existed. See Huntsville Bank & Co. v. Thompson, 212 Ala. 511,
103 So. 477 (1925). A similar Indiana statute provided: "[A] married woman shall not enter into
any contract of suretyship, whether as indorser, guarantor, or in any other manner; and such
contract as to her shall be void." IND. CODE ANN. § 6964 (Burns 1901). See also Russell v. Rice,
430 Ky. 1613, 44 S.W. 110 (1898).
"1 See Jett v. Montague Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Industrial Trust Co. v.
Cantera, 35 Del. 365, 370, 165 A. 338, 341 (1933); In Re Estate of Pinheiro, 33 Hawaii 226, 231
(1934); Stone v. Billings, 167 Ill. 170, 180, 47 N.E. 372, 374 (1897); Hinman v. Treinan, 196 Iowa
701, 706, 195 N.W. 345, 348 (1923); Deering v. Boyle, 8 Kan. 351 (1871); Mayo v. Hutchinson,
57 Me. 546, 547 (1870); Frederick-Town Say. Inst. v. Michael, 81 Md. 487, 502, 32 A. 189, 191
(1895); Browne v. Bixby, 190 Mass. 69, 70, 76 N.E. 454, 456 (1906); Wolf v. Banning, 3 Minn.
202 (1859); Gates v. Williams, 29 N.Y.S. 712, 714 (C.P. 1894); Royal v. Sutherland, 168 N.C.
405, 406, 84 S.E. 708, 709 (1915); Colonial & U.S. Mortgage Co. v. Stevens, 3 N.D. 265, 268, 55
N.W. 578, 579 (1893); Temple v. State, 74 Okla. 215, 216, 178 P. 113, 114 (1919); Phoenix Nat'l
Bank v. Raia, 68 R.I. 348, 352, 28 A.2d 20, 22 (1942); Colonial & U.S. Mortgage Co. v. Bradley,
4 S.D. 158, 163, 55 N.W. 1108, 1110 (1893); First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Mil-
waukee Patent Leather Co., 179 Wis. 117, 190 N.W. 822, 826 (1922).
Other states permit married women co-signatures, but their statutory language does not
equate a married woman's rights with those of an unmarried woman: Missouri (married woman
has sole control of her separate property), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.250 (Vernon 1977); see gener-
ally Barrett v. Davis, 104 Mo. 546, 549, 165 S.W. 377, 378 (1891); Nebraska (married women
have the same rights as married men), NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-202 (1978); Spatz v. Martin, 46
Neb. 917, 918, 65 N.W. 1063, 1064 (1896).
8 See Skokall v. Kimball, 59 N.H. 13, 13 (1879) (citing N.H. GEN. LAWS ch. 1835 § 12 ["no
contract or conveyance by a married woman as surety or guarantor for her husband, nor any
undertaking by her for him on his behalf, shall be binding on her."]); ALA. CODE § 74 (1940);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4.010(2) (Baldwin 1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-503 (1935) (prohibiting
married woman suretyship), amended by GA. CODE ANN. § 53-503 (1969) (limiting married wo-
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fective, virtually all of these statutes had been repealed or
overruled. 4
B. Spousal Co-Signatures: The Pre-1981 Michigan Problem
By 1981, all but five states, Florida, New Jersey, West Virginia,
Colorado and South Carolina, had completely abrogated the common
law rules prohibiting married women suretyship contracts. Court in-
terpretation of Regulation B and the ECOA, however, creates the op-
portunity for state courts to maintain the common law perception of
married women suretyship incapacity whenever a state statute stops
short of complete abrogation of the common law rule. Aside from the
obvious affront to progressive sensibilities, these laws create a breed-
ing ground for inconsistency and uncertainty. The Michigan experi-
ence is illustrative.
In 1975, a married woman in Michigan could contract generally but
she was unable to become a surety."8 The precedent for this rule was
established fifty years earlier by the Michigan Supreme Court in
Monroe State. Savings Banks v. Orloff.8s In Monroe Savings, the
court declared that the coverture prohibition against married women
suretyship contracts remained, even though the legislature had abol-
ished most limitations on the ability of married women to contract.
Consequently, the court held that a married woman "could not bind
her estate by any obligation in the nature of suretyship or by a prom-
ise to pay the debt of another. ' 87 The court reached its conclusion by
interpreting Michigan's Married Woman's Property Act of 185588
which permitted a married woman's individual property to be "con-
tracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised or be-
queathed by her, in the same manner and with like effect as if she
were unmarried." 89 In 1963, Michigan incorporated a similar provi-
man suretyship).
"' See ALA. CODE § 30.4.8 (1957) (surety provision deleted); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-505 (re-
pealed by Acts of 1979 p. 466, 490); 1951 N.H. Laws § 78:2 (eliminating § 340:2 retroactively to
May 12, 1949); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 404.010 (Baldwin 1981), amended by S. 111 § 1, eff. June
2, 1974, (eliminating suretyship provision). See also Cooke v. Louisville Trust Co., 380 S.W.2d
255, 257 (Ky. 1964), which states "KRS 404.010 (2), as amended in 1954, has removed all for-
mer disabilities of a married woman to act as surety for her husband."
"' See United States v. Interlakes Mach. & Tool Co., 400 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
" 232 Mich. 486, 205 N.W. 596 (1925).
87 Id. at 490, 205 N.W. at 597.
" No. 168, Mich. Acts 420 (1855).
"9 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 11485 (1915).
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sion into its constitution; 90 the courts interpreted this provision as
prohibiting married women co-signature contracts.9'
Michigan's Married Women's Property Act and article 10 of the
state's constitution were interpreted to prohibit married women co-
signature contracts despite the fact that in 1974 the state enacted its
own equal credit act. 2 Like the federal act, Michigan's equal credit
law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status.93
Notwithstanding this prohibition, however, Michigan courts continu-
ously barred married women suretyship contracts.9 " Apparently the
courts were unpersuaded that Michigan's credit law removed the
common law limitations on a married woman's capacity to contract.
9 5
An examination of the history of coverture in Michigan gives some
insight into the courts' belief that these coverture disabilities still
existed.
1. Coverture in Michigan
The first attempt to abrogate Michigan's coverture law was in 1855
when Michigan passed its first married women's statute.96 Although
broad in scope,97 this act did not grant contractual equality to mar-
Article 10 of the Michigan Constitution states:
The real and personal estate of every female, acquired before marriage, and all property,
real and personal, to which she may afterwards become entitled to, shall be and remain
the estate and property of such woman, and shall not be liable for the debts, obligations
and engagement of her husband and may be dealt with and disposed of by her as if she
were unmarried.
MICH. CoNsT. art. X, § 1 (1963) (emphasis added).
91 See, e.g., City Fin. Co. v. Kloostra, 47 Mich. App. 276, 209 N.W.2d 498 (1973).
" MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.147a (West Supp. 1975).
93 Id.
94 See United States v. Interlakes Mach. & Tool Co., 400 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
National Bank of Rochester v. Meadowbrook Heights, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 777, 265 N.W.2d 43
(1978).
9" Act No. 168 of the Public Acts of 1855, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 557.1-.5 (West 1970).
" The 1855 Married Women's Act provided that:
[T]he real and personal estate of every female acquired before marriage, and all prop-
erty, real and'personal, to which she may afterwards become entitled, by gift, grant,
inheritance, devise, or in any other manner, shall be and remain the estate and property
of such female, and shall not be liable for the debts, obligations and engagements of her
husband, and may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised or be-
queathed by her, in the same manner and with like effect as if she were married.
Id.
" The 1855 Act's concern was to prevent married womens' husbands from getting control
over their wives' property. One Michigan court noted that the Act was passed "to protect mar-
ried women from the improvidence or predations of their husbands and from their husband's
creditors." National Bank of Rochester v. Meadowbrook Heights, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 777, 782,
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ried women. It did, however, change their legal status by permitting
them to contract with respect to their separate estates independently
of their husbands.98 A second married women's act was passed in
1911.9 This act dealt primarily with the right of a married woman to
obtain and control all earnings resulting from her personal efforts.100
In 1917, Michigan passed yet another act affecting the rights of mar-
ried women. 101 This act expanded the wife's power to contract jointly
with her husband.1 02 It reversed prior law by allowing a married wo-
man to become liable on joint contracts to the same extent that her
husband became liable. Before this law, a married woman was liable
only if the consideration for the contract ran solely to her separate
estate. 0 3 The overall effect of these three Married Women's Acts was
to protect the separate estates of married women. These acts were
not designed to abolish all disabilities of coverture. 04
At first glance it appears that article 10 of the 1963 Michigan Con-
stitution was designed for this purpose. Article 10 begins with re-
sounding clarity: "The disabilities of coverture as to property are
abolished."'1 5 Although this statement appears unambiguous, article
10's legislative history'0 6 indicates that its sole purpose is to constitu-
tionalize the rights granted married women by the three Married
Women Property Acts, 0 7 not to grant additional rights. Thus, in-
stead of removing the remaining disabilities of coverture, article 10
merely preserved the status quo.
In 1974 when the legislature enacted Michigan's Equal Credit
Act, ' 8 it had yet another opportunity to remove all remaining disa-
bilities of coverture and grant complete contractual freedom to mar-
ried women. The legislature, however, failed to take such a bold step.
Without making any specific reference to the married women surety-
265 N.W.2d 43, 46 (1978).
9' See Note, supra note 58, at 80.
" Act No. 196 of the Public Acts of 1911, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 557.11 (West 1970).
100 Id.
101 Act No. 158 of the Public Acts of 1917, MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 557.51-.55 (West
1970).
1o The 1917 Act provided in pertinent part: "Hereinafter, married women shall be possessed
with the power and capacity, and it shall be competent for them to bind and make themselves
jointly liable with their husbands upon any written instrument hereinafter provided." Id.
'01 See Kies v. Walworth, 250 Mich. 34, 229 N.W. 519 (1930); Jarzembinski v. Plodowski, 225
Mich. 104, 195 N.W. 681 (1923); Fisk v. Mills, 104 Mich. 433, 62 N.W. 559 (1895).
'0 See Note, supra note 58, at 87.
108 MICH. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1963).
100 For an excellent account of the legislative debate over article 10, see Peisner, Gone But
Not Forgotten, 47 MICH. ST. B.J. 43 (1968).
101 See Note, supra note 58, at 96.
101 See supra note 92.
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ship question, the Act generally prohibited discrimination on the ba-
sis of sex and marital status."0 9
Consequently, the legal position of married women in Michigan
with respect to suretyship contracts, remained virtually unchanged. A
married woman could not obligate herself by co-signing for another
person; she could bind herself only if the obligation related to her
separate property.110 Since the benefit of the suretyship contract in-
ures to the principal debtor and not the co-signer, married women
were precluded from being sureties.
The Michigan Married Women's Act and article 10 contain provi-
sions similar to the New York statute." Both states permit a mar-
ried woman to contract as if she were unmarried; the New York and
Michigan courts, however, have construed this language differently
with respect to suretyship contracts. In New York, the married wo-
man who contracts "as if she were unmarried" can become a surety
while in Michigan she cannot. " 2 Yet, in both states an unmarried
woman can become a surety.18 This difference in judicial construc-
tion raised certain important questions: Did Michigan's interpreta-
tion of its Married Women's Act and article 10 of its constitution
violate the ECOA spousal co-signature rules; and if so, did this viola-
tion constitute credit discrimination?
C. ECOA Spousal Co-Signature Rules and Credit Discrimination
The primary objective of the ECOA is to combat congressional
findings"" of unfairness and bias against female credit applicants.
Among other prohibitions, the Act prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex and marital status" 6 with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction."' One important aspect involves creditor co-signa-
ture rules. In many instances applicants who do not qualify for credit
109 Id.
11 See Note, supra note 58, at 96.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 72-76 & 85 and accompanying text.
Coverture only creates legal disabilities for a woman when she marries. By implication, an
unmarried woman remains unaffected by the disabilities of coverture and can therefore prop-
erly be a surety.
114 See generally Credit Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 14856 & H.R. 14908 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974). See also Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women, supra note 14.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1691e. (Supp. V 1975). Other prohibited bases of discrimination include race,
color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance income and good faith exercise
of rights under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Id.
"' Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691a. (1976).
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may nevertheless receive it if they produce acceptable co-signers.
Regulation B section 202.7(d)(1), (2) and (5) delineate circumstances
under which creditors may require spousal co-signatures.11" These
Regulation B provisions, along with collateral ECOA rules,118 must be
carefully analyzed to determine whether Michigan's failure to allow
married women suretyship contracts was credit discrimination.
Michigan's construction of article 10 of its constitution and its
Married Women's Act conflicted with the general ECOA and Regula-
tion B mandate against sex and marital status discrimination. As
construed by the Michigan courts, these provisions made it always
impractical and usually impossible for married women to become co-
signers. " 9
If married women could use coverture defensively to bar enforce-
ment of their suretyship contracts, then creditors could justifiably re-
fuse to allow them to co-sign for repayment of another person's
debts.12 0 By disallowing married women suretyship contracts, the
Michigan provisions failed to give married women the same contrac-
tual freedom as others. Indeed, judicial interpretation of these provi-
sions allowed married women to be treated less favorably with re-
spect to suretyship contracts. 21 Finding credit discrimination2 2
Regulation B § 202.7(d)(3) also relates to spousal co-signature requirements. This provi-
sion will be fully discussed later in this Article. See supra note 18 for reference to Regulation B
§ 202.7(d)(4).
18 15 U.S.C. § 1691d.(a)-(b) (1976).
"' It was in the best business interest of a creditor to deny co-signer privileges to married
women because they could not be forced to repay the obligation should the principal default.
Thus married women sureties were a high risk proposition in Michigan and it was generally left
to the creditor's discretion to decide whether married women would be permitted as co-signers.
110 Many creditors claim that discriminatory practices are due not to outmoded assumptions
about women, but to the existence of state property laws. Note, Equal Credit: You Can Get
There From Here - The Equal Credit Opportunity Acts, 52 N.D.L. REv. 381, 391 (1975). See
also ECOA Hearings, supra note 14, at 348. Michigan creditors could make this argument in
reference to the statutory prohibition against married women co-signer contracts. It is unrea-
sonable to think that creditors would permit married women to co-sign contracts that were
unenforceable against them under state law.
1"I A blatant example of unequal treatment of married women is illustrated in Monroe State
Say. Bank v. Orloff, 232 Mich. 486, 205 N.W. 596 (1925). In that case a Michigan court held
that a creditor could not reach a married woman's separate assets to satisfy a debt obligation,
even though she co-signed with her husband as a joint applicant. Yet, the court acknowledged
the creditor's right to satisfy the debt from the husband's separate property. Other Michigan
courts have held similarly. See National Bank of Rochester v. Meadowbrook Heights, Inc., 80
Mich. App. 777, 265 N.W.2d 43 (1978); Isabella Bank & Trust v. Pappas, 79 Mich. App. 274,
261 N.W.2d 558 (1977).
122 Regulation B says that to discriminate against an applicant means to treat an applicant
less favorably than other applicants. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(n). See Miller v. American Express, 688
F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982). Credit discrimination occurs when an applicant is not evaluated indi-
vidually by a creditor's ordinary standards, but rather is judged by his membership in a class.
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depends on whether a creditor has complied with the requirements of
the ECOA and/or Regulation B. Both the Act and Regulation B de-
fine the legal parameters of a creditor's conduct.
1. The ECOA and the Pre-1981 Michigan Problem
In 1978, the Michigan Attorney General ruled that Michigan credi-
tors may refuse to allow married women sureties without violating
the ECOA mandate against sex and marital status discrimination.
Attorney General Frank J. Kelly unequivocally stated that there is
no marital status discrimination when a creditor denies credit to one
who relies on a married woman's signature to repay the debt. 2 ' Ac-
cording to Attorney General Kelly, "[t]he refusal of a person to ex-
tend credit to a husband because the co-signature of his wife is unen-
forceable is not, in my opinion, refusal to extend credit based upon
the marital status of the husband or wife ... 12
There is no ECOA provision which expressly addresses the ques-
tion of whether failure to allow married women co-signers constitutes
sex or marital status discrimination. Nevertheless, an ECOA provi-
sion, section 1691d.(b), explains the relationship between the Act and
state law and gives an insight into how this question should be re-
solved. This provision states that, when evaluating a credit applicant,
a creditor does not engage in credit discrimination by considering
state property laws affecting creditworthiness. 1 5
See Comment, Equal Credit For All - An Analysis of the 1976 Amendments to the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 326, 327 n.12 (1978). In Smith v. Lakeside Foods,
Inc., 449 F. Supp. 171, 172 (N.D. Ill. 1978), it was held that a creditor's failure to comply with
Regulation B entitled the applicant to relief under the ECOA.
" Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5370 (1978).
124 Id. at 3.
"' According to ECOA § 1691d.(b): "Consideration or application of State property laws di-
rectly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness shall not constitute discrimination for purposes of
this title." Section 1691d.(b) has been recognized as a troublesome provision. According to one
commentator:
One obvious difficulty is to decide what is or is not a "state property law." The potential
breadth of the term "property" creates the possibility that a myriad of state statutes fall
within the statutory exception. Moreover, this definitional problem is compounded by
the addition of the words "directly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness." First, this
presents the possibility that whether a law is indeed a property law will be decided sim-
ply by reference to whether it has an effect on creditworthiness. Second, the term
"creditworthiness" is itself elusive, both because the statute and regulations do not de-
fine it, and because there is no agreement in the industry concerning its meaning.
Hume, A Suggested Analysis For Regulation of Equal Credit Opportunity, 52 WASH. L. REV.
335, 356 (1977) (footnote omitted).
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Section 1691d.(b) of the ECOA seems to support the Michigan At-
torney General's position that there is no marital status discrimina-
tion if a creditor refuses credit to one who relies on a married wo-
man's co-signature to obtain credit. First, article 10 of the Michigan
Constitution and the state's Married Women's Act appear to be
within the ECOA state property rights of married women. 2 Like
most states, Michigan has the "contract as if she were unmarried"
language embodied in its Married Women's Property Act.12 7 Michi-
gan's statutes may therefore be accurately described as state property
laws. This is especially true in view of the fact that neither the ECOA
nor Regulation B defines "state property law." Second, Michigan's
statutes directly affect an applicant's creditworthiness. Creditworthi-
ness includes not only a determination of the applicant's intention to
repay, but also his or her ability to repay.12 8 While a person who
needs a co-signer to obtain credit may have the intention to repay
the debt, he or she clearly lacks the ability to repay without the addi-
tional signature. In this instance, the additional signature directly af-
fects the applicant's creditworthiness because without it the appli-
cant is unable to repay. Article 10 of the Michigan Constitution and
the Married Women's Act have been judicially construed to forbid
married women from supplying this additional signature. 2  But for
that statutory construction, a married man who wants to rely on his
wife as a co-signer would receive credit. Thus, Michigan's statute "af-
fects" his creditworthiness " by disallowing his spouse to act as his
co-signer.
Case law provides little guidance regarding the scope of the state
property law exemption. In Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Service
"I Indeed, article 10 begins by making specific reference to a married woman's real and per-
sonal property. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
M' Gates, Credit Discrimination Against Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 VAND. L. REV.
409, 413 (1974).
12 See Dreyer & Rice, Equal Credit Opportunity, 36 Bus. LAW 1203, 1216 (1981); Reizen-
stein, A Fresh Look at the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 14 AKRON L. REv. 215, 216 n.3
(1980).
119 See Wendland v. Citizens Commercial & Say. Bank, 92 Mich. App. 250, 284 N.W.2d 776
(1979); Traverse City State Bank v. Conaway, 37 Mich. App. 647, 195 N.W.2d 288 (1972); De-
troit Newspaper Indus. Credit Union v. McDonald, 9 Mich. App. 146, 156 N.W.2d 62 (1967).
130 Michigan Attorney General, Frank J. Kelly, analyzed the situation differently. According
to Kelly, a creditor's refusal to extend credit to a husband because the co-signature of his wife
is unenforceable does not affect the husband's creditworthiness. "In such a case, the eligibility
for credit of each spouse is dependent upon the individual's own credit standing without regard
to marital status, there being no legal requirement that a creditor grant credit to a person
whose financial status does not warrant the extension of the credit." Mich. Op. Att'y Gen.,
supra note 123, at 3.
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Co., 13' the only ECOA case on the subject, the exemption was denied.
In Markham an unmarried couple filed a joint application for a mort-
gage loan. The application was denied because they were not mar-
ried."3 2 The plaintiffs claimed they had been discriminated against on
the basis of their marital status. The defendants argued that they
should be allowed to consider marital status because state law pro-
vides creditors greater legal remedies against married joint applicants
than it does against unmarried ones.13 3 The federal district court
agreed with the defendants and granted summary judgment on the
ground that the ECOA did not prevent creditors from considering
the special legal ties between two married people created under state
law. 34
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's contention that their
actions were sanctioned by the ECOA provision allowing a creditor to
consider state property laws affecting creditworthiness. The court
reasoned that the state laws concerning marriage were irrelevant for
the purpose of determining creditworthiness because joint applicants,
whether married or not, were jointly and severally liable on their
debts.135 Consequently, the court of appeals disagreed with the lower
court's assessment that creditors had greater remedies against mar-
ried joint applicants.
It is significant to note that the appellate court neither confirmed
nor denied whether the state laws concerning marriage were "prop-
erty" laws affecting creditworthiness which would come within the
ECOA exemption. By finding that the underlying premise upon
which the lower court based its decision was faulty, since no greater
rights were created by the marital bond, the court of appeals was not
compelled to directly address the exemption question. The Markham
district court decision, however, indirectly addressed this question.
That decision implied that state laws concerning marriage are within
the exemption. The defendants, however, did not get the benefit of
the exemption because the court found that their actions were be-
yond its scope.
Article 10 of the Michigan Constitution, the Married Women's Act,
and the law involved in Markham are all state marital laws. If state
13- 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
182 For an excellent analysis of the Markham case, see Comment, Protection of Unmarried
Couples Against Discrimination in Lending Under The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: Mark-
ham v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co., 93 HARV. L. REv. 430 (1979).
. 605 F.2d at 568.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 569.
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laws concerning a creditor's right to collect against a married couple
in the event of default are deemed "state property laws," then a
stronger argument can be made for the proposition that state laws
governing the contractual capacity of married women are state prop-
erty laws within the purview of the ECOA exemption. A contrary
finding would be irrational."'
In short, because the Married Women's Act and article 10 of the
Michigan Constitution are state property laws affecting the appli-
cant's creditworthiness, ECOA section 1691d.(b) exempts their "con-
sideration" or "application" from resulting in illegal discrimination.
This position is consistent with that of the Michigan Attorney Gen-
eral. Thus, under the ECOA, there is no sex or marital status dis-
crimination resulting from Michigan's prohibition against married
women sureties.
2. Regulation B and the Pre-1981 Michigan Problem
A different conclusion may be reached under an analysis of Regula-
tion B. Regulation B allows a married credit applicant who is un-
creditworthy without a co-signer, to use his or her spouse as the addi-
tional party.1"7 Additionally, Regulation B states that creditors shall
not impose requirements upon co-signers that cannot be imposed
upon credit applicants.3 " Thus, if creditors cannot require applicants
to be persons other than married women, then it seems they likewise
cannot require co-signers to be persons other than married women.
These two Regulation B provisions strongly suggest that credit dis-
crimination results when a married woman is prohibited from becom-
ing ,a surety.
Although Regulation B section 202.7(d)(5) expressly allows married
women suretyship contracts, section 202.6 restates that the ECOA
provision exempts consideration or application of state property laws
affecting creditworthiness from resulting in credit discrimination.'3 9
These two Regulation B provisions appear to be contradictory. If
Regulation B allows married women suretyship contracts, then the
" In its most literal sense, article 10 of the Michigan Constitution, which is patterned after
a Michigan Married Women's Property Act provision, is, in effect, a state law concerning mar-
riage. Under the Markham rationale, it is within the state property law exemption.
s 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5) (1977). The creditor however, cannot require that the spouse be
the co-signer. Id.
18 Id.
,31 Id. at § 202.7(6)(c).
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Michigan law prohibiting such contracts is credit discrimination. If
however, Michigan's law prohibiting married women suretyship con-
tracts is a state property law, 140 then under Regulation B's exemp-
tion, its application cannot result in credit discrimination.
It is unclear whether the Federal Reserve Board intended the Reg-
ulation B state property law exemption and the provision allowing
married women sureties to operate independently of each other. Sec-
tion 202.6 sets out rules concerning evaluation of applications and
includes the exemption for state property laws, while section 202.7
states rules concerning extension of credit, including the spousal co-
signature provision. Facially, section 202.6 and 202.7 appear to be
mutually exclusive. The two sections do not relate directly to each
other, and there is no indication that the Federal Reserve Board in-
tended them to be read together.14 ' By placing each provision in a
separate Regulation B section, the Board may have intended for the
state property law exemption and the spousal co-signature rule to op-
erate independently of each other.
Statutory rules of construction regarding inconsistent provisions in
the same statute support this position. For example, one rule of con-
struction says that a general provision which might embrace certain
matters is superseded by a provision which specifically addresses
these matters.
42
The above rule appears particularly applicable to the inconsistency
between Regulation B sections 202.6 and 202.7. The provision con-
cerning the state property law exemption applies only incidentally to
the situation of a state property law prohibiting married women
spousal co-signatures, whereas the provision allowing spousal co-sig-
natures specifically addresses that situation. Applying this rationale,
Regulation B section 202.7, which specifically allows married women
to co-sign for their husbands, would prevail over section 202.6 which
generally exempts application of state property laws by creditors
from being labelled credit discrimination.
Another applicable rule of construction involves the principle that
courts should give effect to every part of a statute, if reasonably pos-
340 See supra notes 126 & 127 and accompanying text.
141 While congressional silence is not always determinative of congressional intent, it has on
many occasions been regarded as a significant factor.
M The United States Supreme Court stated the rule in this way: "[G]eneral language of a
statutory provision although broad enough to include it, will not be held to apply to a matter
specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment." Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin,
285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932). Ginsberg involved a conflict between a general and specific provision
of the bankruptcy act.
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sible. 141 If Regulation B section 202.6 superseded section 202.7, then
the provision relating to spousal co-signatures (202.7).would be inef-
fective. If however, the regulations were construed to allow section
202.7 to operate as an exception to section 202.6, then both parts of
the statute would be given effect.144
Logic suggests that the Board would have clarified its meaning had
it intended that the spousal co-signature provision be pre-empted by
state property laws. Absent more elucidation1 40 the Board's actual in-
tent can only be surmised. The apparent intent, however, is that the
spousal co-signature rule is not pre-empted by the state property law
exemption.
3. The ECOA/Regulation B Conflict
If Regulation B permits married women suretyship contracts, not-
withstanding its state property law exemption provision, then there
exists an obvious conflict with the ECOA. As previously stated, the
ECOA, unlike Regulation B, does not have a provision allowing mar-
ried women suretyship contracts. Nevertheless, like Regulation B, it
does have the state property law exemption.
Under the ECOA, a state's prohibition against married women
sureties is not credit discrimination; such a prohibition does consti-
tute credit discrimination under Regulation B. This conflict raises yet
another important question: Should Regulation B or the ECOA be
followed in determining whether creditors can prohibit married
women suretyship contracts?
On a number of occasions courts have been faced with similar
questions.14'6 These courts first seek to determine whether the Act ex-
14$ Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 1288-89, 136 N.W.2d 410, 416 (1965). In Remus
v. City of Grand Rapids, 274 Mich. 577, 586, 265 N.W. 755, 758 (1936), the Michigan Supreme
Court noted that: "A provision in the statute is not to be construed so as to render nugatory
any other provision if by any reasonable construction it may be unnecessary to do so."
144 Lumpkin v. Department of Social Servs., 59 A.D.2d 485, 400 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1977), sup-
ports this proposition. In that case the court said "[w]hen two statutory or regulatory provi-
sions are potentially in conflict, they should be construed in such a manner that the overriding
purposes of both can be preserved." Id. at 490, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 222 (citation omitted).
14 There are no Board comments, published opinions or statements regarding whether the
Board intended Regulation B §§ 202.6 and 202.7 to be read separately or together.
14 Questions regarding regulatory conflicts usually arise when a claim is made that the Fed-
eral Reserve Board exceeded its authority by drafting a particular regulatory provisions. For
example, in Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), it was alleged
that the Board went beyond its congressional mandate to implement the Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1968), by drafting § 226.2(k) of Regulation Z. Regulation Z § 226.2(k) requires
creditors who grant credit in more than four installments to comply with the Truth in Lending
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pressly delegates regulatory authority to the agency. 1 7 The ECOA
contains such an empowering provision, which gives the Federal Re-
serve Board the authority to promulgate regulations to effectuate the
purposes of the Act.' " The focus then shifts to determining whether
the regulatory provision in question is "reasonably related" to the
purposes of the enabling legislation.14 9 If such a relationship exists,
the courts will sustain its validity. 50 But validation occurs only if the
regulatory provision is not inconsistent with the enabling statute. " '
An inconsistent regulatory provision generally exceeds the broad
rulemaking authority vested in the administrative agency.
Regulation B section 202.7(d)(5), allowing married women sureties,
is unquestionably related to the overall ECOA objective of eliminat-
ing credit discrimination. In essence, this provision finds sex and
marital status to be irrelevant in establishing co-signature criteria. It
recognizes that a significant number of applicants, many of whom are
Act even if no finance charge is imposed. The Supreme Court held that the Board was well
within its regulatory bounds by promulgating the "more than four installment" rule. Id. at 371.
Other questions regarding regulatory conflicts involve claims that the Federal Reserve Board
has incorrectly interpreted a federal act or regulation. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,
444 U.S. 555 (1980); Gantt v. Commonwealth Loan Co., 573 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1978); Johnson v.
McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1975); Brown v. Providence Gas Co., 445
F.Supp. 459 (D.R.I. 1976); St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 573 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977).
W See Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. at 387.
s 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a) (1974) states in pertinent part:
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
These regulations may contain but are not limited to such classifications, differentiation,
or other provision, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of
transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the
purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate
or substantiate compliance therewith. In particular, such regulations may exempt from
one or more of the provisions of this subchapter any class of transactions not primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes, if the Board makes an express finding that
the application of such provision or provisions would not contribute substantially to car-
rying out the purposes of this subchapter. Such regulations shall be prescribed as soon as
possible after the date of enactment of this Act, but in no event later than the effective
date of this Act.
14 See Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. at 369.
150 Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1968). See also American Trucking Ass'ns
v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
151 The Ninth Circuit has stated that a district court should confer great deference upon
formal interpretations of the Federal Reserve Board that point to reasonable and consistent
interpretations of regulations. See St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 573 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977).
In Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 219 (1981), the Supreme Court declared
that: "[A]bsent some obvious repugnance to [this] statute [Truth in Lending], the [Federal
Reserve] Board's regulation implementing this legislation should be accepted by the
courts. .. "
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protected under the ECOA, would not receive credit without a co-
signer.1 52 Therefore, Regulation B requires co-signature standards to
be imposed in a non-discriminatory manner. The Regulation B provi-
sion expressly stating that a creditor cannot impose requirements on
the co-signer that cannot legally be imposed on the applicant,153 evi-
dences a strong regulatory commitment to implement the ECOA goal
of eliminating discrimination in all aspects of the credit process.
15 4
Meeting the ECOA objectives, however, is not the ultimate test of
whether Regulation B will be followed. Although the Regulation B
co-signature provisions are reasonably related to ECOA objectives,
they conflict with the Act. Generally, conflicting regulatory provisions
will not supersede the Act. 5' If the ECOA sustains the validity of a
state property law prohibition against married women suretyship
contracts, Regulation B cannot declare a creditor's activity to be
credit discrimination. To do so would clearly be to take a position
inconsistent with the Act.
Inconsistency is allowed only in limited circumstances. Section
1691(f) of the ECOA describes these circumstances. Although that
section refers solely to inconsistent state law provisions, its implica-
tions are clear: state credit discrimination laws will be followed ex-
cept to the extent they are inconsistent with the ECOA.1 56 By anal-
ogy, an inconsistent regulatory provision cannot be followed if it
conflicts with the ECOA. There is one caveat: a state law is not con-
sidered inconsistent if it gives greater protection to the credit appli-
cant.1 57 It appears that this caveat applies to a regulatory provision
I' It should be noted that Regulation B does not require creditors to accept co-signers to
establish an applicant's creditworthiness. However, if a creditor's policy is to accept co-signers,
Regulation B requires that a spouse be allowed to supply the additional signature. 12 C.F.R. §
202.7(d)(5) (1977).
13 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5) (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1974).
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
The inference is that any provision, including a regulatory one, that is inconsistent with
the ECOA must be disregarded. Where a state law is alleged to be inconsistent with the ECOA,
the Federal Reserve Board must decide if an inconsistency in fact exists. 15 U.S.C. § 1691d.(f)
(1974). Nevertheless, this probably does not imply that the Board may also decide if its regula-
tion is "inconsistent" with the Act. Such a position would undermine the authority of the
courts to effectively check regulatory abuse of authority.
" Id. Section 1691(f) states as follows:
(f) Compliance with inconsistent State laws; determination of inconsistency.
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the
provisions of this subchapter from complying with, the laws of any State with respect to
credit discrimination, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any pro-
vision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. The Board is
authorized to determine whether such inconsistencies exist. The Board may not deter-
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which is inconsistent with the Act. Therefore, if Regulation B gives
greater protection to the credit applicant, it, instead of the ECOA,
should be followed.
The ECOA rule that allows states to bar married women co-signa-
ture contracts does not afford greater protection to the credit appli-
cant than Regulation B. The avowed purpose of state rules, like arti-
cle 10 of the Michigan Constitution and the Married Women's Act, is
to protect the co-signing married woman.' 5 On the other hand, Reg-
ulation B gives more opportunities to the applicant to obtain credit
by allowing married women sureties when the applicant fails to meet
the creditor's standards of creditworthiness. In this respect, the Reg-
ulation B co-signature rules are more protective of credit applicants.
At least one federal court has held that the Regulation B co-signa-
ture rules are for the benefit and protection of the credit applicant
and not the co-signer. In Morse v. Mutual Federal Savings & Loan
Association, " a federal district court noted that a wife's allegation
that her rights had been infringed by a creditor's policy requiring her
to co-sign for her husband's debt, did not state a Regulation B cause
of action for marital status discrimination. The court concluded that
the wife, as co-signer, was not the "aggrieved applicant"' "0 and there-
fore could not recover.' 6' Because the debt involved belonged solely
to her husband, and because he was the only credit applicant, the
court reasoned that only he could bring suit for Regulation B viola-
tions.162 This case makes clear that the benefit and protection de-
rived from enforcement of the Regulation B spousal co-signature
rules are given only to the applicant spouse. Ultimately, it appears
that Regulation B, not the ECOA, should be followed because Regu-
lation B affords greater credit applicant protection.
Despite Regulation B's enhanced protection for credit applicants,
it is doubtful that a court will allow the Regulation to pre-empt the
ECOA state property law exemption. This is primarily because Con-
mine that any State law is inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter if the
Board determines that such law gives greater protection to the applicant.
"' See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. It may be argued that when a married
woman seeks joint credit with her husband, the Michigan law barring her co-signature protects
her as a credit "applicant." There is, however, a subtle irony in this protection. In this instance,
the law which allegedly protects the wife applicant actually results in denial of credit to her or
to the married couple as a unit. See ECOA Hearings, supra note 14, at 362.
"' 536 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Mass. 1982).
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gress did not intend for the ECOA to disturb state property laws.163
During the ECOA congressional hearings, Congress was told that
Michigan law did not allow married women to become sureties. At-
torney Margaret J. Gates, co-director of the Center for Women Pol-
icy Studies, argued that the ECOA should invalidate this Michigan
provision because it discriminates against married women.""4 Attor-
ney Gates acknowledged historical congressional reluctance 16  "to
pass legislation which will interfere with those laws governing prop-
erty and family which are considered to be within the province of the
states."'16 6 Nevertheless, she contended that "[wihat is at issue in
cases such as the one in Michigan is a law enacted for the economic
protection of married women which is now being used to deny
11 In drafting the ECOA, Congress was careful not to invade the dominion of the state in the
area of property law, an area traditionally left to local control. Thoronton, The Not-So-Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 5 ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 363, 369 (1978).
I" Attorney Gates noted that Michigan's law not only creates problems for married women
who want to become co-signers, but also for married women who want to apply for joint credit
with their husbands. Gates prescribed the problem in the following manner:
This Michigan law might make it difficult for married couples to receive joint credit
when both of their incomes are necessary in order for them to be sufficiently
creditworthy. Thus, a bank or mortgage lender might claim that a wife's income must be
discounted completely or partially because her separate property could not be recovered
from in the event of divorce or the husband's death. According to Michigan's law, the
only time a creditor could not maintain such a claim would be when the loan/credit
obtained were for the benefit of the wife alone, that is, to buy her a car. In that case her
separate property could be held liable.
See ECOA Hearings, supra note 14, at 361. Gates stressed further the unfairness of the Michi-
gan law by admonishing Congress that it would be abetting and aiding credit discrimination
against women if it allowed the ECOA to exempt state property law. Gates continued:
This decision could lead to a situation whereby a couple receives joint credit only if the
husband would have received it on his own anyway. This classic case of discrimination
would not be eliminated by [the proposed state property law exemption provision] be-
cause the very law resulting in the discrimination would be incorporated by reference
into the Federal credit law.
Id. Gates' concluding argument on this point was that the federal government should make its
commitment to end credit discrimination as strong as its commitment to end employment dis-
crimination. She emphasized the fact that federal law preempts protective state labor laws:
In the case of title VII, Federal courts have found that State laws designed to protect
women workers must give way to the mandate of equal employment opportunity. If the
Congress is committed to equal credit opportunity, it ought not close the door to it by
enacting a provision exempting all state property laws from the Federal bill.
Id.
'" The Supreme Court acknowledged the federal government's iron-clad reluctance to dis-
turb state property laws in United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). The Court issued an
unequivocal directive as to when state property laws should be preempted: "They should be
overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the National
Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suf-
fer major damage if the state law is applied." Id. at 352.
'" See ECOA Hearings, supra note 14, at 361.
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financially independent married women the full protection of this ec-
onomic position. "167
Normally, when an area of conduct which has been traditionally
regulated under a state's power is also the subject of federal legisla-
tion, federal preemption will not occur unless that is the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.1" Congressional retention of section
1691d.(b) in the ECOA is indicative of its desire to forego federal
preemption of state property laws. Consequently, Michigan creditors
may consider and apply state property laws barring married women
suretyship contracts without violating the EqOA.1"
To say that the ECOA allows Michigan to have a law prohibiting
married women suretyship contracts does not mean that Congress
approves of such a law. As previously noted, the ECOA permits such
laws because Congress has been reluctant to interfere with the right
of the states to establish their own property laws.1 70 Regulation B
section 202.7(d)(5), which allows married women suretyship con-
tracts, suggests that the Federal Reserve Board was unconvinced that
the states should have this much latitude in establishing property
rights. The Board, however, must implement the intent of Congress.
Thus, even though Regulation B section 202.7(d)(5) offers greater
protection to the credit applicant, it must yield to the obvious intent
of Congress to allow state property law preemption.
167 Id.
"' Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
169 There is, however, one final argument supporting the view that the Regulation B provi-
sion, allowing spousal co-signatures, should be followed rather than the ECOA state property
law provision. It can be argued that ECOA deference to state property laws refers to "real
property" laws. In its most literal sense, article 20 is not a real property law because there is
generally no real property component attached to co-signature rules. One could therefore con-
clude that the Michigan spousal co-signature rule falls outside the state property law
exemption.
This argument is seriously flawed, however, since it lacks substantive support. There is no
indication from the ECOA's legislative history that "state property law" was intended to em-
brace realty only. Without concrete support, the real property argument is too tenuous to be
seriously entertained. One commentator has suggested that Congress probably had in mind
community property when it formulated ECOA § 1691d.(b). This suggestion, however, is also
mere speculation. See Maltz & Miller, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B,
31 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1978). Given the flaw in the real property argument, Michigan's law
barring married women sureties will probably preempt Regulation B on the spousal co-signa-
ture question. This means that Michigan's interpretation of its Married Women's Act and arti-
cle 10 of its constitution is not credit discrimination.
"' See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
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4. The Post-1981 Michigan Problem
Whether a Michigan creditor engages in credit discrimination by
prohibiting married women suretyship contracts has been rendered
moot by legislative action. The Regulation B/ECOA conflict over the
validity of Michigan's law can now be resolved without fanfare or
heated debate. In 1981 the Michigan legislature expressly declared
that married women may enter into suretyship contracts. 1 1 This leg-
islative amendment first repeats that part of article 10 of the Michi-
gan Constitution and its Married Women's Act which allows a mar-
ried woman to contract as if she were unmarried."' It then declares
that all limitations on a married woman's ability to contract are re-
moved.17 Finally, the new amendment provides that "[a] married
woman may act as a surety for the debt or obligation of another per-
son, including the debt of her husband, by signing a written instru-
ment providing for her suretyship. 1 " The amendment makes Michi-
gan law consistent with the mandate of Regulation B. By amending
its Married Women's Act in this manner, the Michigan legislature
ratified sub silentio, the belief that Regulation B correctly defines
credit discrimination to include a creditor's barring of married
women suretyship contracts.
1 5
Although Michigan's problem is eradicated, the five separate prop-
erty states171 with pre-1981 Michigan-like statutes keep the contro-
versy alive and concrete.'" Like Michigan, these states have statutes
which permit a married woman to contract as if she were unmar-
ried.17 8 Whether these state courts will follow the pre-1981 Michigan
approach and prohibit such contracts, or take a more progressive
view rendering further legislation unnecessary, is unsettled.
It is feasible that the courts of the five undecided jurisdictions will
7 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.25, P.A. 216 (West 1981).
173 Id. at § 557.21.
173 Id. at § 557.23.
'M See supra note 171.
M, The Michigan legislature was well aware of the married women suretyship problem. A
group of Michigan women lawyers requested the legislature to change the law so that married
women could contract as fully as others. This request for change, plus a law review note, see
Note, supra note 58, prompted State Representative Mary Brown to introduce P.A. 216 con-
taining the married women suretyship provision. (Conversation with Mary Kay Scullion, House
Democratic Research Staff, Office of Rep. Mary Brown, (May 26, 1983)) [hereinafter cited as
Scullion Conversation].
170 These states are Florida, New Jersey, Colorado, West Virginia and South Carolina.
177 See supra notes 69 & 74 and accompanying text.
' CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-2-208 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-16
(West 1968); W. VA. CODE § 48-3-1 (1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-5-10 (Law. Co-op 1962).
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be induced to follow Michigan's pre-1981 approach. There are several
reasons why a state might follow this approach and deny married
women suretyship contracts despite Michigan's 1981 amendment.
First, the amendment seems to reflect a change of legislative opinion,
not a clarification of legislative intent. Nothing in the amendment's
history suggests that the legislature was concerned that the judiciary
had incorrectly construed the "contract as if she were unmarried"
language. 7 9 In view of this, it is highly probable that the Michigan
courts had been correctly following the intent of its legislature by
construing the pre-1981 statute to bar married women suretyship
contracts. Other state courts may similarly conclude that they are
correctly effectuating their legislature's objectives by deciding to bar
such contracts. Second, other states may be inclined to follow Michi-
gan's court decisions denying married women suretyship contracts
because these decisions were made at a time when there was no stat-
ute expressly providing for a contrary result. A state court may con-
clude that if its legislature intends for married women to become
sureties, then, like Michigan, it will enact legislation unequivocally
saying so. These reasons suggest that the "Michigan problem," while
resolved in that state, is still an actual controversy in the jurisdic-
tions that have not yet decided the married woman suretyship
question.
D. Perspectives on the Post-1981 Michigan Problem
Because the "Michigan problem" is likely to reappear, it is impor-
tant to consider alternative resolutions. It seems that the ECOA state
property law exemption will permit states to bar married women
suretyship contracts. As previously noted, Regulation B must yield to
the Act because it is inconsistent with the Act. o80 This does not
mean, however, that states have no option. Many states have recog-
nized the unfairness of treating married women differently and have
179 A spokesperson from Michigan State Representative Mary Brown's office stated that in-
correct judicial interpretation was never an issue. Simply stated, the time had come for the
legislature to remove the uncertainty surrounding married women suretyship contracts. Cases
highlighting the expediency for change were brought to the legislature's attention. For example,
a married woman in Oakland, Michigan's second largest county, could not sign as surety to get
her husband out of jail. Additionally, at the time the Michigan legislature was considering P.A.
216 and debating whether married women should possess the right to co-sign, the Michigan
Supreme Court was simultaneously pondering the same question. See Scullion Conversation,
supra note 175.
160 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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opted to allow them complete contractual freedom." 1 This approach
is the most sound and least discriminatory. It is directly attuned to
the ECOA and Regulation B mandate against sex and marital status
discrimination.
Those states undecided on the spousal co-signature question can
benefit significantly from the Michigan experience. Before the 1981
amendment, there was chaos in Michigan over the extent to which
married women coverture disabilities had been removed. 182 Thus,
there was no certainty regarding circumstances under which married
women could be bound in suretyship contracts. The confusion esca-
lated when one court held in City Finance Co. v. Kloostra, ss that
article 10 of the Michigan Constitution, expressly abolishing the disa-
bility of coverture' 58 and allowing the married woman to deal with
her property as if she were unmarried, did not supersede the state's
Married Women's Property Act. This Act restricted a married wo-
man's liability on a contract co-signed with her husband to her joint
holdings, and protected her separate property from liability. 85 The
husband, however, was liable to the extent of both his separate and
joint property. The court distinguished coverture defenses from disa-
bilities and held that while the disabilities of covertures were abol-
ished by article 10, the defenses of coverture were not.' The court
"I The following six state statues give married women the same contractual rights as mar-
ried men: IDAHO CODE § 32-904 (1949); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-21 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
23-202 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.01 (West 1969); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-202 (1978); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 32.1 (Purdon 1936). Twelve state statutes allow husband and wife the same
contractual rights as if they were unmarried: CAL. CIv. CODE § 5103 (West 1969); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46-9 (West 1958); Mo. REV. STAT. § 36-105 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.070
(1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-2-6 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE §
3103.05 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5 (West 1976); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03
(1975); W. VA. CODE § 48-3-8 (1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.15 (West 1981); WYO. STAT. § 20-1-
202 (1977). Twenty states and the District of Columbia allow married women to have the same
contractual rights as unmarried women: ALA. CODE § 30-4-8 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 25.15.100
(1962); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-208 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 311 (1953); FLA. STAT. §
708.08 (1971); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 404.020 (Baldwin 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 164
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, §§ 1 -2 (1975); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § 2 (West 1969);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2:16 (West Supp. 1973-1974); N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG LAW § 3-301 (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-05 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-4-3 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-5-10 (Law Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-2-7
(1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-2 (1953); UTAH STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 61 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. §
55-136 (1981); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 30-201 (West 1968).
282 See generally Peisner, supra note 106.
182 47 Mich. App. 276, 209 N.W. 2d 498 (1973).
IU The first sentence of article 10, § 1 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution reads: "The disabil-
ities of coverture as to property are abolished."
's See supra note 88.
's 47 Mich. App. at 288-89, 209 N.W.2d at 505. It is difficult to articulate the difference
between coverture defenses and disabilities. One commentator explained it in this way:
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found that the provision of the Married Women's Property Act limit-
ing the wife's liability, was a defense of coverture and therefore, still
applicable. Consequently, her separate assets and income could not
be seized by a creditor unless she received the consideration from the
contract herself.187 When a married woman co-signs as a surety, she
binds herself to pay a debt owed by another. The court's decision in
Kloostra requiring the debt to go to a married woman's estate before
she can be held liable, precludes her, in most instances, from entering
into suretyship contracts.
The married woman suretyship problem became exacerbated eight
years after Kloostra when a different panel of the Michigan appeals
court found in Michigan National Leasing Corp. v. Cardillo,5 that
the same constitutional provision, article 10, was intended to super-
sede the Married Women's Property Act. Consequently, the court
held that article 10 abolished the disabilities as well as the defenses
of coverture.
Significantly, the Cardillo decision expressly rejects the Kloostra
court's distinction between disabilities and defenses of coverture.5 9
The court in Kloostra adhered to the traditional idea that the wife
needed protection from her husband 90 and, therefore, her separate
property could not be seized for debts for which she co-signed with
him. The court's opinion was based on its interpretation of the con-
stitutional convention delegates' intent in supporting article 10.191
According to the Kloostra court, "the 'defense of coverture' which
insulated a married woman's separate estate from the debts of the
marriage seems to be just the type of 'protection' the quoted dele-
gates were attempting to provide.
'192
The court in Cardillo rejected the Kloostra court's notion of
The terms "disability of coverture" and "defense of coverture" are somewhat confusing.
For example, the modern definition of a disability of coverture is a disability that the
Michigan legislature imposed upon a married women vis-a-vis her estate, once having
allowed her to retain a separate estate in the first instance. This is conceptually distinct
from the old common law disabilities of coverture. The only definition of a defense of
coverture is a defense that obtains by operation of a statutory disability, since the mar-
ried woman legally possessed no property during her coverture (marriage) under the old
common law.
Vihtolic, New Status of Married Women's Property Rights in Michigan, 5 MICH. CORP. FIN.
B.L.J. 15 (1981).
I87 See Note, supra note 58, at 87.
18 103 Mich. App. 427, 302 N.W.2d 888 (1981).
'" Id. at 433, 302 N.W.2d at 891.
See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
"' The court derived the intent of the delegates from the debate which preceded the provi-
sion's adoption. 47 Mich. App. at 277, 209 N.W.2d at 501-02.
,' Id. at 278, 209 N.W.2d at 505.
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women "having their cake and eating it, too," saying it was "highly
inequitable to allow a married women to rely on the abolishment of
the disability aspect in one instance while allowing her to implore it
as a defense in another."' 93 The court concluded that the plain mean-
ing of article 10 indicated that there was no legitimate basis for dis-
tinguishing between the disabilities and defenses of coverture.
Thus, following Kloostra and Cardillo, Michigan had two conflict-
ing resolutions to the same question. Because these two decisions
could not be reconciled, it became imperative for either the Michigan
Supreme Court or the state legislature to ultimately decide whether
coverture disabilities and defenses had been abolished. 194 The cover-
ture question is inextricably bound to the married women suretyship
question. If all remaining coverture defenses and disabilities had
been removed, then married women in Michigan would have com-
plete contractual equality. Thus, they could act as sureties and would
be held liable to the same extent as any other co-signer. On the other
hand, if coverture disabilities had been removed but coverture de-
fenses remained, then married women in Michigan would have lim-
ited contractual freedom and could use coverture defensively to bar
enforcement of their suretyship contracts.
The Michigan Supreme Court and the legislature both realized the
importance of resolving the coverture disability/defense problem.
The court immediately granted leave for the defendants to appeal
the Cardillo result; however, due to swift legislative action, the court
reconsidered and reversed its order.'95 After carefully examining the
question, the legislature removed all doubt regarding the appropriate
interpretation of the "contract as if she were unmarried" language.
The 1981 amendment is unequivocal in its pronouncement that mar-
ried women may enter into suretyship contracts.'96 Thus, the legisla-
ture approved the Cardillo result and apparently obviated the need
to distinguish between coverture defenses and disabilities. The net
193 103 Mich. App. at 434, 302 N.W.2d at 891.
'" For a thorough and critical analysis of Kloostra and Cardillo and the discord among
Michigan courts regarding the removal of common law coverture disabilities in Michigan, see
generally Comment, Michigan's Law of Coverture, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 649.
195 On November 4, 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The reversed
order came on May 18, 1982. The court stated:
It appearing that this case is not jurisprudentially significant in view of the enactment of
1981 PA 216, we VACATE the order of November 4, 1981, and DENY the application
for leave to appeal because the Court is not persuaded that the questions presented
should be reviewed by this Court.
See Cameron, Michigan's New Statute On Married Women's Contractual Capacity: The End
of Coverture?, 61 MICH. STAT B.J. 22 n.17 (1982).
I See supra note 171.
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result of the amendment is to abolish coverture defenses as well as
disabilities.
Although the 1981 Michigan amendment is not flawless, 9 " it can
be heralded in several respects. First, the legislature's immediate re-
sponse to the spousal co-signature/coverture problem following
Cardillo,18 suggests that it believed that a legislative resolution to
the problem was superior to a judicial response. While courts clearly
possess the authority to interpret ambiguous statutory language and
extrapolate its meaning, 199 there exists a risk of misconstruing legisla-
tive intent. Misconstruction in the instant case would mean curtail-
ment of a married woman's contractual freedom. Because contractual
freedom is a highly valued, basic right,200 judicial speculation of legis-
lative intent to curtail such freedom should be avoided whenever
possible.2°0
III. CONCLUSION
The undecided state legislatures should follow the Michigan Legis-
lature and take a bold step toward clarifying the "contract as if she
were unmarried" language. These undecided states have an advan-
tage over Michigan in that they have the opportunity to avoid the
pandemonium which existed in Michigan over the proper interpreta-
tion of the three Married Women's Property Acts, article 10 of the
Michigan Constitution, the state's Equal Credit Act, and Kloostra
and Cardillo. It may be well worth the legislatures' time to by-pass
the Michigan thicket and unequivocally resolve the married women
suretyship question. Married women and creditors would benefit
from a concise legislative pronouncement. Moreover, their attorneys
would benefit from a cogent declaration of legislative intent regarding
the validity of married women suretyship contracts.202
"' See Cameron, supra note 67, for a critical examinaton of Michigan P.A. 216.
I98 Cardillo was decided February 3, 1981. In less than one year, the Michigan legislature
amended its Married Women's Property Act to coincide with the Cardillo result.
I" It is a commonplace that courts will further legislative goals by filling the interstitial si-
lences within a statute. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
00 See generally Punke, Freedom To Contract, as Basic American Democracy, 81 CONN.
L.J. 246 (1976).
1oa It has been noted that legislative silence is a "dubious indicium of legislative intent." See
St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 573
F.2d 572, 574 (9th Cir. 1977). It has been further noted that while judges must decide unantici-
pated cases in the absence of clear legislative directives, they must temper judicial creativity in
the face of legislative silence. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
202 The following excertps from a legal department release of the Michigan Credit Union
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The Michigan Legislature faced the married women suretyship
question squarely and resolved the question in favor of such con-
tracts. Michigan is now in agreement with most states in declaring
that the historical justification for protecting married women from
entering into suretyship °0 contracts no longer exists. Unanimity of
sister jurisdictions on the spousal co-signature question may provide
an incentive for the undecided state legislatures to vote in favor of
such contracts.
Notwithstanding Michigan's 1981 amendment, the undecided
states may opt to deny married women suretyship contracts under
the ECOA state property law exemption. If these states so decide,
they should consider tempering the harshness of an absolute ban on
married women suretyship contracts whenever possible. For example,
even though a state may be permitted to bar married women surety-
ship contracts, it should not do so if married women waive their de-
fenses to enforcement of such contracts. Should a dispute regarding
enforcement arise later, a court could determine whether the waiver
was voluntarily given and intelligently made.2 0 A signed, notarized
League is indicative of the difficulties Michigan lawyers faced in explainig the coverture restric-
tions to creditors:
A loan cannot be enforced against a married woman in Michigan under certain circum-
stances. An explanation of these types of circumstances is set forth below. "Married"
means married at the time the woman signed the loan documents. Marital status at
other times is irrelevant. Michigan's law on coverture creates some exceptions to the
usual requirements of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), according to the Fed-
eral Reserve Board. A credit union may ask any woman offered as a co-maker whether
she is married, the credit union can refuse to accept her as a co-maker because of the
coverture laws. If a credit union tells a woman loan applicant that she must have a co-
maker, it may refuse to accept her husband. This is because accepting the husband as co-
maker may cause the credit union to lose rights against the wife. Because of this, if a
woman offers a man as a co-maker, he may be asked whether he is married to her. The
above restrictions on enforceability of loans against married women are unique to Michi-
gan, and certainly out of step with the ideas of women's equality. Hopefully, the legisla-
ture or the Michigan Supreme Court will abolish these restrictions. However, the courts
now are still enforcing the restrictions described above, and you will want to consider
them in your credit granting decision.
Michigan Credit Union League, Legal Dep't Release (Mar. 1982).
203 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
'" The standard used for determining the validity of a waiver in criminal cases can be used
in married women suretyship cases. This standard requires the waiver to be "an intentional
relinquishment... of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
The waiver must not only be intentional, "but must be knowing intelligent acts done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
In the case of a married woman surety, a creditor should inform her of the coverture defense
and explain the ramification of waiver. If the married woman co-signs after receiving this infor-
mation, her signature should create a valid suretyship contract.
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waiver gives some evidence of voluntariness. If the court determines
that the waiver is valid, then it should enforce the suretyship con-
tract, notwithstanding the state property law defense. Although the
waiver approach involves some dangers, 05 a state electing to bar
married women suretyship contracts should seriously consider adopt-
ing it. This practical approach balances the state's desire to protect
married women from coercive and improvident co-signature decisions
with Regulation B's desire to insure that credit decisions are made
without sex or marital status discrimination.
A court might also invoke the estoppel doctrine to balance the
right of married women to enter into suretyship contracts with the
state's right or duty to protect these women.2 °0 For example, a court
should hold that state property law is no defense to a married woman
who intentionally co-signs for another with knowledge that her signa-
ture is not binding. Married women co-signers should not be allowed
to defraud creditors.
20 7
While the Michigan experience regarding married women surety-
ship contracts will undoubtedly provide guidance to courts and legis-
latures, further guidance from the Federal Reserve Board is also
needed. The Board should examine the spouse who is illegally re-
quired to co-sign. Moreover, the Board should clarify the ambiguities
regarding the right of this co-signing spouse to simply refuse to repay
the debt. Finally, the Board should review the question of whether
Regulation B section 202.7(d)(5) allowing spousal co-signatures is su-
perseded by the Regulation B section 202.6 state property law ex-
emption and resolve the apparent conflict between the two sections.
205 An obvious danger of waiver is that many married women who are coerced to co-sign by
their husbands or creditors may incur substantial difficulty proving coercion. For a general dis-
cussion of the dangers of waiver, see Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 478 (1981).
The doctrine of estoppel is founded on the broad and just rule that one shall not defend
his or her voluntary act, or even deny its validity, to the prejudice of another. Lockhart v.
Kentland Coal & Coke Co., 182 Ky. 673, 679, 207 S.W. 18, 20 (1918).
207 Several courts have held that the disability of coverture should not be used to allow mar-
ried women to perpetrate fraud. See, e.g., Anderson v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 38 Ind. App. 190,
76 N.E. 811 (1906); Overcast v. Lawrence, 141 Ky. 25, 131 S.W. 1029 (1910); Galbraith v. Lun-
sford, 87 Tenn. 89, 9 S.W. 365 (1888). However, false statements made by married women to
persons who know of their falsity will not work as estoppel. See Field v. Campbell, 164 Ind. 389,
72 N.E. 260 (1904).
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